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INTRODUCTION
An enormous volume of scholarly literature has been written
about Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' in the few years
since the U.S. Supreme Court decided that case.2 Daubert rejected the
requirement of Frye v. United States that novel scientific evidence be
generally accepted in the relevant scientific field in order to be admis-
sible. Instead, the Court in Daubert concluded that the Federal Rules
of Evidence embodied a more flexible relevance and reliability test.
4
That test required consideration of at least five factors: (1) whether the
theory or technique could be, or had been, tested; (2) whether the
theory or technique had been subjected to peer review and publica-
tion; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and
(5) whether the principle or technique had widespread acceptance. 5
What scholars have ignored, however, is that the Daubert test and
factors-or at least a particular reading of that test and those factors-
reflect patriarchal assumptions about the nature of knowledge.
Those assumptions include the idea of a "realist epistemology,"
an objective reality waiting "out there" to be discovered.6 Moreover,
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See, e.g., David L Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door,
Please: Exploring the Past, Undemtanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of
Scientific Evidence, 15 CAFiozo L REv. 1799 (1994); G. Michael Fenner, The
Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON
L Ray. 939 (1996); John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST.
MARn's LJ. 1 (1996).
3. Fryev. United States, 293 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cit. 1923).
4. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert' Guide to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-MeaningJurispdence, 32 HAAv. J. ON LGIS.
3, 46-48 (1995) [hereinafter Taslitz, Daubert's Guide] (summarizing the new
Daubert test).
5. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96; see also Taslitz, Daubert's Guide, supra note 4, at
48-50.
6. David L Faigman, The Evidentiay Status of Sodal Science Under Daubert: Is It
"Scientific," "Technical," or "Other" Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L 960,
969 (1995) [hereinafter Faigman, Social Science] ("These two criteria (falsifiability
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despite Daubert's rejection of the Frye general-acceptance test, Daubert
continues to rely on a masculinist, market-based notion of truth: the
fierce competition for dominance and reward in the free marketplace
of ideas will weed out flawed conceptions of the one true objective
reality that we seek to discover.7 Furthermore, the market-based no-
tion of truth tests ideas based on linear, universal standards of what
constitutes knowledge! The "universal" standards privilege theory
over context and experience.9 The market and the Court also make a
dualistic determination, qualifying evidence as either "science" or
"non-science," with the former granted far greater epistemic value.'0
The boundary between "science" and "non-science" must be carefully
policed." Additionally, Daubert expresses a fundamental distrust of
community-based, collaborative, non-hierarchical decision-making--
and 'error rate'] dearly indicate the Court's choice of a conventional, scientific realist
view of the scientific method.").
7. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95 (retaining widespread acceptance, peer review, and
publication as factors in the admissibility decision); Kans. R. POPPER, Reason or Revo-
lution?, in THE Myr OF THE FRtmEwom 69 (1993) [hereinafter POPPER,
FRwMEwoRK] (stating "the objectivity of natural and social science is not based on an
impartial state of mind in the scientists, but merely on the public and competitive
character of the scientific enterprise and thus on certain social aspects of it")
(emphasis added). I develop an analysis of Dauberts reliance on a masculinist, mar-
ket-based notion of truth in my forthcoming companion piece, Andrew E. Taslitz, A
Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence Revisited- On Markets, Dualisms, and
Historical Method (forthcoming 1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, Feminist Approach Revis-
ited]. I will refer to Feminist Approach Revisited or the companion piece as a
shorthand to indicate I will develop that argument more fully therein.
8. See POPPER, FRAMEwoR, supra note 7, at 69-70.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 18-33, 38-51; see also Taslitz, Feminist Approach
Revisited, supra note 7.
10. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (stressing the distinction between "science" and "non-
science" and grounding the "admissibility" analysis in a conception of sound scientific
methods); Faigman, Social Science, supra note 6, at 962 (reading Daubert as recog-
nizing science's epistemic superiority over other methods of inquiry).
11. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach Revisited, supra note 7; see also Faigman, Social Science,
supra note 6, at 962 (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court embraces Popper's crite-
rion of 'falsifiability' to distinguish scientific statements from nonscientific
statements," and interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 702 as "regulating that supply of facts to
the jury in a manner that states a preference for science as the preeminent method for
discovering most facts"); see also Larry Laudan, The Demise of the Demarcation Prob-
!en, 2.1 WORMNG PAPERs: THE DEMARCAmON BETWEEN SCmNCE AND PsEuo-
ScmNCE 8 (1988) ("[Miuch of our intellectual life, and increasingly large portions of
our social life, rest on the assumption that we... can tell the difference between sci-
ence and its counterfeit."); see generally CHARLns AluN TAYLOR, DEFINING SCIENCE:
A RHnmroaic oF DEMARCATION 5 (1996) (describing the demarcation of science from
non-science as central to practicing scientists' efforts to maintain their privileged po-
sition of "epistemic authority").
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that is, the decision-making of juries. Daubert requires judges to be
gatekeepers against information that will be abused by the communal
whole.' 2 Finally, Daubert embodies an insistence on objectivity, a be-
lief that politics and values serve no proper role in scientific or
evidentiary reasoning."- This final point follows from Daubert's as-
sumption that a "true" answer to our questions is waiting to be found,
not constructed. 4
How Daubert reflects these assumptions and why they are patri-
archal will be discussed shortly here and at more length in a
companion piece. To say that something is patriarchal does not, how-
ever, necessarily mean that it is wrong. To the contrary, patriarchal
science and evidence law have achieved important ends in many
spheres." But there is one type of factual inquiry-the determination
of mental state-for which the feminist critique holds particular force.
12. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Daubert's distrust of the jury is embodied in the
Court's notion of trial judges as "gatekeepers," protecting juries from being misled by
pseudo-scientific evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Daubert also contained contra-
dictory language, rejecting "overly pessimistic" views "about the capabilities of the
jury and the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 596. Nevertheless, post-Daubert scholarship has often tended to emphasize
the reason for keeping poor science from juries rather than ways to improve juries'
handling of purported scientific evidence. See, e.g., Faigman, Social Science, supra note
6; David L Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of
Science, 39 Amz. L Rnv. 67 (1997) [hereinafter Faigman, Age ofScience]; see generally
KEaNNm R. FosTER & PErER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWL.-
EDGE AND TIE FEDERAL COURTS (1997) (seeking to improve judicial screening of
scientific evidence from juries under Daubert). Although the Court has recently
stated that Daubert admits a "somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than
would have been admissible under Frye," thus hinting perhaps at a slightly more
flexible reading of Daubert than some commentators might allow, nothing in that re-
cent pronouncement undermines the argument that Daubert embodies a realist
epistemology and still requires a serious "gatekeeper" role for the trial judge. See Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997). Also, the Court recently decided
another case that shed further light on Daubert, but not in a way that alters the analy-
sis here. See United States v. Schefer, 118 S. Ct. 1265 (1998) (addressing
constitutional issues involved in excluding polygraph evidence). I will discuss the re-
maining universalist, market-based, and dualistic aspects of Daubert in. Taslitz,
Feminst Approach Revisited supra note 7.
13. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579; see also Faigman, Age of Sdence, supra note 12, at 68-
69 (condemning the political aspects of scientific and evidentiary reasoning about the
battered woman syndrome).
14. See Dauber: 509 U.S. at 579; see also Faigman, SocidalScience, supra note 6.
15. See Faigman, Social Science, supra note 6, at 962 ("In identifying, predicting, and
controlling the world around us, science is by far the most powerful intellectual tech-
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Mental states do not exist "out there," but rather are the result of
an interpretive act. Mental states are thus social constructions consti-
tuted in language. Feminism, unlike patriarchal science, embraces the
notion of a linguistic, interpretive, socially constructed reality. 6 For
such a reality the realist epistemology of Daubert makes little sense.
That does not mean anything goes: relativism need not be the neces-
sary consequence of rejecting realism. But judging the plausibility of
an interpretive act is a very different endeavor from a realist inquiry,
nique known."); RONALD L CARLSON ET. AL., EvimcE IN T THE NINETs (3d ed.,
1992) (recounting the ways in which evidence doctrine helps to prevent jury misdecd-
sion). Neither Professor Faigman nor Professors Carlson, Imwinkelried, and Kionka
recognize that the versions of scientific and evidentiary method that they praise reflect
androcentric thinking. For analyses of the androcentric biases in science, see for ex-
ample, SANDRA HARDING, Tm ScmNcE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) [hereinafter
HARDING, SciENcE QUESTION]; SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE
KNOWLEDGE: THINING FROM WOMEN'S LrvEs (1991) [hereinafter HARDING,
WHOSE ScmNcE?]; HELEN E. LONGINO, SciENcE As SociAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES
AND OBJEcIrrrrY IN ScmNrnFIc INQUIRY (1990). But see PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN
LEvrrr, HIGHER SUPERSTmON: THE ACADEmIC LEI AND ITS QUARRELS wrm Sci-
ENCE (1994) (challenging the "muddleheadedness" of postmodern and cultural
constructivist critiques of scientific method); ELLEN R. Kamn, FEMINISM UNDER
FIRE (1996) (rejecting feminist claims that scientific method is fundamentally male-
centered). For analyses of androcentric thinking in evidence law, see Ann Althouse,
The Lying Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories From the Evidence Case-
book, 88 Nw. U. L Rav. 914 (1994); Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence:
Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Refr rms, 19 HAav. Wo~mE's L.J. 127 (1996); Kit Kin-
ports, Evidence Engendered 1991 U. ILL L Ray. 413; Marilyn MacCrimmon, The
Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of Evidence, 25 U. BRIT. COLum. L REv.
36 (1991); Aviva Orenstein, "My GodP1"A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L Ray. 159 (1997) [hereinafter Orenstein, My
God.J; Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Court-
room, 5 S. Ca. Rnv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996) [hereinafter Taslitz,
Patriarchal Stories]. I am not suggesting that patriarchal science and evidence law do
not have serious flaws. Indeed, both have often worked to support gender and racial
oppression. See ANDREW E. TAsLrrz, RAPE AND THE CULaa OF THE COURTROOM
(forthcoming N.Y.U. Press 1999) [hereinafter TAn'rz, CULTURE Ov TaE COURT-
ROOM]. Nevertheless, the successes.including modem technology and at least some
basics of a fundamentally fair due process-must be acknowledged. The perceived
failure to recognize those successes indeed contributes to the assault on the credibility
of feminist epistemologies. See GROSS & LEvrrr, supra. My narrow claim here is that
for a certain subset of issues defined below, the costs of patriarchal reasoning so out-
weigh the benefits that a feminist paradigm, rather than - moderate feminist-
sympathetic reform, should replace or at least serve as a co-equal complement to mas-
culine scientific and evidentiary theories. Outside of expert-evidence questions, on
the other hand, a more radical rethinking of evidence law along feminist lines may be
required from the ground up. See TAsurz, CuLTURE OF THE COURTROOM, sup ra.
16. See infra Part 1.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
involving very different notions of "reliability" than are contained in
the Daubert factors. 7
Feminists are skeptical of the particular type of market-based rea-
soning contained in Daubert's endorsement of publication, peer
review, and widespread acceptance. Feminists accept the need for the
public critique of ideas, but such critique can take place with an atti-
tude of connected knowing-of first looking for the best in an idea,
rather than seeking to rip it to shreds in the snarling teeth of the com-
petitive tiger.' The attitude of connected knowing also recognizes the
social nature of scientific and other knowledge. Science is then seen as
a collaborative, group activity created by a relevant scientific commu-
nity. Valid scientific knowledge may thus be produced in different
ways by different scientific communities, so there is no one universal,
totalizing, and dominant scientific method. Indeed, knowledge is
better seen as contextual rather than universal, and insights from ac-
tual scientific practices and human experience, from the particular and
the unique, need not be devalued relative to broad, universal theo-
ries. 9 Such theories, indeed, may be especially misleading when
17. See infia Parts II & III; see also Taslitz, FeministApproach Revisited, supra note 7.
18. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach Revisited, supra note 7.
19. The term "connected knowing7 originated in MAY BELEKcY Er AL, WOMEN'S WAYS
OF KNOWING (1986). "Connected knowing" is characterized by a stance of belief and
an entering into the place of the other person or idea that one is trying to know as a
first step toward acquiring, validating, and evaluating knowledge claims. See Nancy
Rule Goldberger, Looking Backward, Looking Forward, in KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE,
AND POWER 1, 5 (Nancy Rule Goldberger er al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter Goldberger,
Looking Backward]. Connected knowing is often contrasted with "separate knowing,"
which is characterized by a distanced, skeptical, and impartial stance toward that
which one is trying to know. See Goldberger, Looking Backward, supra at 5. See Blyth
McVicker Clinchy, Connected and Separate Knowing: Toward a Marriage of Two
Minds, in KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE, AND PoWER, supra at 205-47, for a detailed ex-
planation of the difference between "separate" and "connected" knowing. I argue in
the companion piece for a third way, "constructed knowing,&" the position at which
truth is understood to be contextual; knowledge is recognized as tentative, not abso-
lute; and it is understood that the knower is part of (constructs) the known. See
Goldberger, Looking Backward, supra at 5. Most importantly for our purposes here,
constructed knowing entails a "flexibility in approaches to knowing and ability to assess
the appropriateness and utility of a particular way of knowing given the moment,
situation, cultural and political imperatives, and relational and ethical ramifications."
Nancy Rule Goldberger, Cultural Imperatives and Diversity in Ways of Knowing, in
KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE, AND PowER, supra at 335, 357. Sensible scientific
"knowing" may thus require both separate and connected knowing. Rather than ex-
ploring the complexities of these different styles of knowing here (a task I leave for
the companion piece), I loosely use the-term "connected knowing" as a shorthand for
[Vol. 5:1
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studying mental states, because human thought often relies on nonlin-
ear processes, using metaphor, dialogue, ambiguity, and irony, in
sharp contrast to the rigid deductive and inductive thinking of patri-
archal science.2'
Feminism rejects, as well, the dualism of patriarchal science: the
policing of a sharp boundary between privileged "science" and un-
worthy "non-science." Feminists do not see the distinctions as so
clear, nor do feminists necessarily privilege one side of the boundary
over the other in all contexts. 2' There is instead a continuum, band, or
loop linking shades of science and shades of non-science, and different
points on the continuum might be appropriate for different purposes.
Some practices generally denominated "scientific" involve reasoning
more similar to that of historians than physicists, yet the historical
mode of reasoning may be closer to the task at trial-recreating and
understanding a past event-and more useful and "scientific" for evi-
dentiary purposes than any model based on laboratory physics.2
Feminists will generally prefer solutions that maximize commu-
nal and contextual decision-making and, therefore, favor increasing
the quantity and quality of scientific evidence, rather than its exclu-
sion, as a goal of evidence law.U Given the interpretive and social
nature of mental-state determinations, feminists recognize the inher-
ently political nature of the relevant evidence rules and view political
considerations, broadly defined, as unavoidably tied to epistemologi-
cal ones.24 Daubert's pretext of universal objectivity is thus rejected by
emphasizing that there are other ways of knowing than the "separate knowing" most
often associated with male thinking.
20. See ROBERT GRUDIN, ON DIALOGUE: AN ESSAY IN FREE THOUGHT (1996)
(illustrating and praising nonlinear thought processes).
21. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach Revisited supra note 7; see aso HARDING, WHOSE SCI-
ENcE?, supra note 15, at 85 (stating that no one has ever determined what is "unique
about the scientific method"); RuTH BLIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF
BIOLOGY AND ITS THEoRIES ON WOMEN 4 (1984) (claiming there is "no single cor-
rect scientific methodology"); Sandra Harding, Science is "Good to Think With", in
SCIENCE WsS 16 (Andrew Ross, ed. 1996) ("Mhe natural and social sciences we
have are in important respects incapable of producing the kinds of knowledge that are
needed for sustainable human life.. . under democratic conditions.").
22. Historians "reconstructions," especially of past mental states, are interpretive in
much the same way as mental-state determinations at trials are. See Taslitz, Feminist
Approach Revisited, supra note 7.
23. See infia text accompanying notes 109-12, 143-255; Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself
Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L.
Rnv. 1, 113-14 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, MyselfAlone].
24. See infra text accompanying notes 321-60.
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
feminists in favor of a candid political understanding of how scientific
and legal knowledge are created, once again, without embracing rela-
tivism.
25
This Article addresses several of these aspects of a feminist ap-
proach to social scientific evidence, specifically, the interpretive nature
of mental states, the feminist attitude toward juries, and the political
nature of evidence law.
Recognizing that mental-state determination is an interpretive,
political act lays the groundwork for addressing in the companion
piece the remaining aspects of a feminist approach to social scientific
evidence-specifically, the flaws of market-based reasoning and
masculinist dualisms and the strengths of a non-relativist alternative.
The present piece thus lays the foundation for the companion piece's
articulation of a new feminist approach to admitting social scientific
evidence. Before laying the first brick in that foundation, however,
some points of clarification are necessary.
First, there are in fact many "feminisms. " 2' By "feminism" I mean
any theory that draws on the lives of women or seeks to emancipate
them from oppressive -social constraints imposed by gendered roles,
rules, and expectations.' Here I adopt a "pragmatic postmodern
25. See infra text accompanying notes 38-41; see aso Taslitz, FeministApproach Revisited,
supra note 7.
26. See, e.g., VALERIE BRYSON, FimIsT PoLmcAL THEoRY: AN INTRODUcTION (1992)
(tracing history of differing schools of feminist political thought); JOSEPHINE DONo-
vAN, FEMINiSTTuro THE INTRELEcruAL TRADMONS op AmEIsCAN FEMINISM
(exp. ed. 1992) (contrasting the intellectual roots of liberal, cultural, Marxist, Freu-
dian, existential, and radical feminisms); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLMCS AND
HUMAN NAruR (1988) (articulating the different views of human nature underlying
liberal, Marxist, socialist, and radical feminisms). Professor Orenstein identifies two
broad schools of feminist thought as having the richest traditions: "difference" and
"dominance" feminisms. See Orenstein, My God', supra note 15, at 184-91.
"Difference" feminism posits that, either because of nature or nurture, women per-
ceive and think about the world differently than men. See Orenstein, My Goal, supra
note 15, at 184. "Dominance" feminism focuses on the power differential between
men and women and the processes by which the former subjugate the latter. See
Orenstein, My God, supra note 15, at 187. Rather than choosing between these
schools, Professor Orenstein views both as valuable, shedding light on different as-
pects of gendered problems. See Orenstein, My God., supra note 15, at 188-91. 1
follow a similar approach here. To avoid awkward constructions, when I defend a
"feminist" approach hereinafter, I am referring specifically to my brand of pragmatic
postmodern feminism and do not mean to imply that there is a unitary "feminist"
viewpoint.
27. This definition follows from the fusion of the insights of both "difference" (learning
from women's lives) and "dominance" (focusing on male power) schools of feminism
discussed supra note 26. This fusion incorporates the idea of "patriarchy, a social sys-
(Vol. 5:1
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feminism." By this term I mean, in part, that I have sympathy for
many of the lessons of postmodernism: that power and knowledge are
intertwined; that we discursively (that is, in language) create, rather
than discover, objects of knowledge; that the self is partly a permeable,
social creation; and that much knowledge is local or contextual, rather
than universal. 8 But I adopt postmodern insights only to the extent
tern that privileges male over female power in spheres of endeavor our society values
highly." Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 394. Patriarchy is fundamentally
.a system of meaning, a way of organizing and understanding the world." Taslitz,
Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 402. One commentator put it thus:
Patriarchy, as defined by feminists, is the process of using the system of
male supremacy found in traditional families (i.e., the "father's house") as a
paradigm for the world order. Patriarchy is a system in which men create
the definitions of power, the ways to maintain power, and the avenues for
obtaining power in all of its forms.... Patriarchy then goes on to place...
socially constructed and exaggerated differences into a hierarchy where
those qualities associated with maleness are valued most.
Rus ERviN FUNK, STOPPING RAPE: A CHALLENGE FOR MEN 29-30 (1993). Impor-
tanty, this definition does not deny that men can suffer under patriarchy (for
example, as the frequent victims of their own violence) or that women can have forms
of power. However, the power society values most will disproportionately be the
male's.
28. See, e.g., SUSAN J. HEKMAN, GENDER AND KNOWLEDGE: EMErrs OF A POSTMOD-
ERN FEMINISM 4, 185 (1990) (noting postmodernism's rejection of universal,
foundational "metanarratives" in favor of a recognition of the "local and contextual"
analysis of dominance and the "interpretive character of all human knowledge"); Di-
ana Tietjens Meyers, Introduction, in FEnNISTS RETINK THE SELF 1-3 (Diana
Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) (contrasting the more permeable, relational self of much
feminist theory, including postmodern feminism, with "homo economicus-the free
and rational chooser... isolate[d] ... from personal relationships and larger social
forces"); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 259-76 (1997) (discussing the
power/knowledge connection and the discursive creation of knowledge). Robin West
questions both postmodernism's recognition that power is not necessarily repressive
(arguing that patriarchal power always is oppressive) and its emphasis on discourse
(arguing that patriarchy primarily produces silence from women). See WsT, supra at
259-76. Regarding the first point, I note only that many posrmodera theorists do
recognize and explain how power is used to oppress women, and, in any event,
women can benefit from an awareness of the liberating possibilities of their own
power. See, e.g., HIMAN, supra. Regarding the second point, I agree with Andrew
Vogel Ettin that, "[almid oppression, both language and silence are potential means
to integrity and means of self-defense--tools and weapons." ANDREW VOGEL ETriN,
SPEAKING SILENCE: STILLNESS AND VOICE IN MODERN THOUGHT AND JEwIsH TRA-
DION 12, 169-86 (1994) (citation omitted). More importantly, a focus on
discourse reveals the mechanism by which men silence women. See TAsLrrz, CuL-
TURE OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 15.
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that they are useful. 9 I therefore reject the most extreme, perhaps cari-
catured, versions of postmodernism in which reality is seen solely as
the vision imposed by the most powerful group. 0 And I believe, or at
least find it useful to behave as if I believe," in some absolutes, such as
the fundamental dignity of all persons. I thus reject the dichotomy
between modernism and postmodernism, finding the insights of each
more or less useful for different purposes. 2 I am pragmatic in a final
way, as well: in my willingness to find truth in the fact-based particu-
larity of life.33
29. See generally CHARLENE HADDOCK SIEGFRIED, PRAGMATISM AND FEMINISM:
REWEAVING THE SOCIAL FABRIC (1996) (linking pragmatism and feminism because
they both locate emancipatory potential in everyday experience).
30. See GRoss & Lavrr, supra note 15, at 11-12 (describing postmodernism).
31. See LOYAL RUE, By THE GRACE OF GUI E: THE ROE OF DECEPTION IN NATURAL
HISTORY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS (1994) (arguing~that social and individual survival re-
quite that we deceive ourselves about some of the great questions of politics and
morality).
32. See WEST, supra note 28, at 292 (critiquing aspects of postmodemism but approving
its skepticism as perfectly consistent with a non-postmodern, essentialist alternative to
Enlightenment visions of human nature); see also DAvID S. CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE
SUBJECT OF LAw: TOWARD A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY at xii (1997)
(arguing "[t]he extreme positions in these debates-like the belief in objectivity or
the belief that all knowledge is illusory-are less than helpful, as are the exaggerated
caricatures of traditional thinkers as ideologues or postmodem thinkers as nihil-
ists.... [Tihe most helpful cultural criticism takes place between the extremes in
contemporary debates over postnodeism... ."). I am, therefore, more concerned
with what is persuasive and effective than with what is consistent in modern or post-
modem world views. Thus, I sometimes cite such traditional thinkers as Immanuel
Kant to support a chain in an argument ultimately leading to postmodern insights,
Compare MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTmNT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 11-12 (1996) (explaining Kant's traditional, atomistic notion of
the self), with infia text accompanying notes 47-94 (explaining why Kant's definition
of "mind" is consistent with more permeable notions of the social sel).
33. See SIEGFRIED, supra note 29. I spend time explaining that my approach is neither
rigidly modernist nor rigidly postmodemist to fend off a type of critique that I find
illegitimate: a theory is flawed precisely because it is inconsistent with one type of
world view or the other. I find things of value in both world views, and my argu-
ments should be accepted or rejected based on their persuasive force apart from
whether I fit in any particular ideological camp. On the other hand, I find that post-
modernist ideas are often unfairly caricatured and belittled in the hallway
conversations of evidence conferences. In these conversations postmodernism's diver-
sity is ignored, and the mere label "postmodem" is deemed sufficient to debunk an
idea. That too seems wrong. The ideas should be judged on their merit. By allying
myself in some ways with postmodem theorists, therefore, I seek to give them their
due. My goal is thus to acknowledge my equal debt to two different intellectual
movements and to ask the reader to take seriously the modem and postmodern theo-
rists on whom I rely. Judge the worth of their ideas and mine, regardless of the camp
to which we belong.
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In this Article I do not attempt a comprehensive philosophical
defense of the pragmatic postmodern version of feminism that I ar-
ticulate here. My goal here is more concrete-to illustrate how such a
feminism might lead to very different conclusions about the admissi-
bility of some social science evidence than does Daubert.m More
precisely, I am interested not so much in Daubert itself as in its un-
derlying epistemological and political assumptions, its evidentiary
"attitude." That attitude has implications far beyond Daubert's spe-
cific holding.
I also want to re-emphasize that the scope of my task is to articu-
late a feminist evidentiary vision where mental state is at stake in a
criminal trial. Thus, proving the mental element of the prosecution's
case-in-chief-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, cold blood, heat of
passion, and non-consent-all fit within this enterprise. This enter-
prise also includes evidence concerning mental states essential to
defenses, whether derivative or affirmative. Mistake of fact, belief in
the necessity of using deadly force in self-defense, insanity, and aspects
of duress are all included.35 That inclusion extends to certain uses of
syndromes, profiles, and other "group character evidence" when of-
fered to prove mental state.36 It is, therefore, in defining "mental state"
that this Article's argument begins.
34. Importantly, I must stress that I do not adopt or defend any of the particular theories
of feminist science or epistemology surveyed in the sources I cite supra note 15. In-
deed, I am often more concerned with other types of feminist theorists whose work
has more direct relevance to law, for it is a revision of law's conception of science in
certain contexts, not of science itself, for which I argue here. Moreover, I draw on
many theorists, both male and female, whose work is not necessarily feminist, yet
which supports feminist insights. For those who question whether men can offer
anything of value to feminism, see WHo CAN SPEAY_? Aumounr AND CRMcAL.
IDENTri (Judith Roof & Robyn Wiegman eds., 1995); AucE JARDINE & PAUL
SMrH, MEN IN FEMINSM (1995).
35. See JOSHuA DussLR, UNDERSTANDING CRimINAL LAw (2d ed. 1996) (defining
these terms). While my focus is on mental-state determination, the theory presented
here and in the companion piece is a comprehensive one for the use of social scien-
tific evidence in court: use special standards for admitting social science evidence
regarding mental state, but mainstream standards where social science evidence is of-
fered for other purposes. See infra notes 117-42 and accompanying text.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 109-27.
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I. MENTAL STATE AS AN INTERPRETIvE Acnvirr
The understanding that mental state is partly a self-conversation,
a linguistic event, is the keystone to my argument. Part I explains the
central implication of this insight, namely, that mental state is a so-
cially-constructed interpretation rather than a pre-existing reality.
Fully appreciating this point requires understanding in turn that the
"self" as an isolated individual is a fiction-for our "selves" are social
notions tied to our cultural and group connections. 7 Kriowing our
self-conversations (mental states), therefore, requires knowing much
about our social position. But mental-state determination ultimately
and unavoidably involves the jury in that conversation. Thus, we need
a conception of the proper role of the jury in that task, an idea devel-
oped in Parts II and III of this Article. Along the way, Part I addresses
whether the notions of confused and unconscious thinking create
problems for the idea of mind as self-conversation, concluding that
these notions are in fact not problems at all. Part II then explores
more fully the implications of Part I's argument that mind is partly
self-conversation ("autologue") and that the "self' is a social, relational
concept. Parts III through V finally conclude by exploring the neces-
sary epistemological and political implications for evidence law of
viewing mental states as interpretations.
A. Mind asAutologue
1. Universal Truth: The Realist Assumptions of Evidence Law
Feminist theory associates the idea of a single, objective, universal
truth with androcentrism, i.e., male centeredness3 Such a notion of
truth separates the subject and object of study, with the former being
37. See infra text accompanying notes 67-94.
38. See, e.g., HmmAN, supra note 28, at 62-65; Orenstein, My God, supra note 15, at
189; see also SANDRA Lips=z BEM, THE Lmisas op GENDER 2 (1993)
("[A]ndrocentrism or male-centeredness... is... [the] definition of males and male
experience as a neutral standard or norm, and females and female experience as a sex-
specific deviation from that norm.... [Man is treated as human and woman as
'other.'").
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irrelevant to the nature of the latter." Rephrased, the observer does
not alter the observed nor interact with it to create a "truth.""
Feminist theory challenges this notion of an objective truth
waiting to be discovered-viewing knowledge as situated and affected
by context, which includes the nature of the subject or observer.41 In-
deed, the observer and the observed are so closely intertwined that
they cannot dearly be kept distinct; the subject/object dichotomy
breaks down. Furthermore, to the extent that we can speak of a sub-
ject, the subject's knowledge is possible only in relationship to
others.Y It is therefore important to understand knowledge in com-
munity, rather than focusing simply on a supposed isolated knower.4"
39. See Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is "Strong Obectiv-
iy"? in FEmmSM & ScmNCE 235, 243 (Evelyn Fox Keller &: Helen E. Longino eds.,
1996).
40. See oIuyAmt CODE, RincowRCAL SPACES: ESSAYS ON GmmNDmm) LOCATIONS 51
(1995) [hereinafter CODE, RHETORICAL SPACES] (rejecting the "traditional para-
digms" that picture objects as permanent and distinct from subjects, in favor of a
vision of knowledge as involving "negotiations between knower and known"); RoB-
ERT KmE, INTRODUCnON TO THE PmILOsoPH oF SCIENc 47-53 (1997)
(concluding that while the "observational/theoretical" distinction-the idea that we
can make observations of the world apart from our unobservable, theoretical models
of that world-is vague, it "has produced a remarkably accurate epistemological track
record in science over the last 300 years").
41. See Lo<RRANE CODE, WHAT CAN SnaE KNOW? FEMnIsT THEORY AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 1-26 (1991) [hereinafter CODE, WHAT CAN SHE
KNow?] (arguing that the sex of the knower matters); HAmrNG, WHOSE SCIENCE?,
supra note 15, at 119-20 (discussing feminist standpoint epistemology and recog-
nizing that knowledge is socially situated); C ARINE A. MAcKmNON, TOWARD A
FEmrmsT THEORY OF THE STATE 97-105 (1989) (asserting that femi msm rejects
"objectivity"). Objectivity claims that, "[t]o perceive reality correctly, one must be
distant from what one is looking at and view it from no one place and at no time in
particular, hence from all places and all times at once." MAcKNNoN, supra at 97.
42. See HEcat*, supra note 28, at 62-65 (discussing the impact of the postmodem re-
jection of the subject/object dichotomy in feminist theory); see aso Ki.a, supra note
40, at 158.
43. See CODE, WHAT CAN SHE KNow?, supra note 41, at 121 (raising the idea of
"knowledge as a communal, often cooperative... activity .... [Knowledge claims
are... speech acts, moments in a dialogue that assume and indeed rely on the par-
ticipation of (an)other subject(s) . . ."); LINDA JEAN SH EHERD, LnNG Tm VaXU
THE FEMNINE FAcE OF ScIEN E 11-12, 24, 124, 131, 225-29 (1993) (stressing the
role of inter-relatedness in feminine knowing).
44. See generally sources cited supra notes 41-43. There are three broad types of feminist
approaches to science: (1) "feminist empiricism," stressing stricter adherence to tradi-
tional scientific norms as a way of overcoming sexism; (2) "feminist standpoint"
epistemology, arguing that women's standpoint in reality is less partial and perverse
than men's; and (3) "feminist postmodernism," holding powerful skepticism about
traditional notions of reason. HaDING, ScmNcE QuEmoN, supra note 15, at 24-
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Moreover, the idea of a single, universal truth cloaks other valid per-
spectives, thus silencing the female voice. There can be multiple
"truths" without sliding into relativism or nihilism.45
Mainstream philosophy of science has, of course, long adopted
more moderate versions of these insights. Most mainstream thinkers
would agree that observation can alter what is observed.46 They would
further agree that different theories can explain the same data, so the-
ory choice/creation is at least partly a socially constructed reality.
Additionally, these thinkers understand that an observer's prejudices
and historical setting can skew both theory and observation, leading to
"bad" science.
47
But mainstream thought views these matters largely as cautions
helpful in doing traditional science more effectively. There is still an
objective reality waiting to be discovered, an object of study separate
and apart from the knowing subject. While relationships and scientific
communities affect how knowledge is produced, we can and should
strive to discover knowledge of the objective world that is more than
simply the social constructions of our communities. Mainstream
theorists thus recoil from the permeable, relational, socially con-
structed world of feminist epistemologists, decrying them all as
dreaded, closeted relativists.
28. Yet even feminist empiricism, the most conservative of these three theories, draws
insights from postmodemism, see HARDING, ScmN c QUESTION, supra note 15, at
25, and recognizes knowledge as a communal, not individual, endeavor. See Kna, su-
pra note 40, at 201.
45. See HmAAN, supra note 28, at 63-64.
46. See, e.g., DAVID FAUST, THE LIMrrs op ScimNmnic REASONING 13 (1984) (noting
that the key underlying questions in scientific observation include: "We know we al-
ter what we measure, but what forms of alteration can be expected, which can be
avoided, and how can we avoid them?").
47. See KI, supra note 40, at 64-67, 159-63; Susan Haack, Towards a Sober Sociology
of Science, in THE FLIGHT FROM Scmcn AND REASON 259, 259-64 (Paul Gross et
al. eds., 1996).
48. See KLEE, supra note 40, at 64-67, 177-79, 188-89, 207-37.
49. See K.a, supra note 40, at 73-92, 188-89. I emphasize that I take no position on
who is "right" regarding knowledge of the physical world in the debate between
mainstream and feminist philosophers of science. Indeed, I concede much to main-
stream thinkers in the discussion to follow regarding knowledge of the physical
world. My conclusions sympathetic to the various feminist arguments concern only
knowledge of the mental states relevant in a criminal trial, not in the physical world. I
draw on many sources beyond the philosophy of science, however, for thinkers in
wider areas of concern in both feminism and the philosophy of mind have much to
offer concerning knowledge of mental states. My primary task-to illustrate how
feminist insights would change our treatment of expert testimony regarding mental
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Yet evidence law similarly, although often properly, commonly
assumes that there is a single truth "out there." 0 That "Johnny
stabbed Ritchie" is either true or false, regardless of whether the fact-
finder chooses the correct answer. If we cannot make such statements,
then we cannot speak of injustice in the sense of Johnny's being falsely
convicted for the act of another." Evidence law thus shares the realist
assumptions of mainstream philosophy of science.
2. Anti-Realism and the Literary Mind
Realist assumptions make no sense when the question at issue is
mental state: "What was in Johnny's mind when he stabbed Ritchie?"
Among the many competing definitions of "mind" in philosophy are
mind as behavior, mind as brain, mind as computer.5 2 But these con-
ceptions are not those of the criminal law. We cannot offer evidence
of biochemical reactions in Johnny's brain or of the sequencing of his
neural processors to prove that he had the "purpose" to kill. The law
instead adopts a linguistic notion of mind, mind as self-conversation.
states in criminal trials-does not require me to defend in detail the position of any
particular thinker.
50. See WInmAm TwnING, RTHINKING EVIDENCE 32-91 (1990) (explaining the
"rationalist" epistemology of traditional evidence law and scholarship).
51. SeeJosm'H D. GaANo, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND no LAw 12-13 (1993). Daubert
illustrates this sort of realist evidentiary thinking. Daubert involved the question of
whether Bendectin caused a birth defect. See Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). That question of biochemical causation necessarily partly in-
volved a realist epistemology, an assumption of an objectively true answer waiting to
be discovered. Leading evidence scholars agree that the test articulated in Daubert in-
deed involved realist assumptions. See Faigman, Socia Science, supra note 6, at 969. It
might be that Daubert involved realist assumptions only because the context before
the Court demanded it, and in a different context, the Court might reject realism.
But leading scholars, see, e.g., Faigman, Social Science, supra note 6, have not so nar-
rowly interpreted Daubert. I take issue with the wisdom of their reading of that case.
I concede, however, that Daube's realism makes sense in proving physical facts
but not in proving mental state. In doing so, I do not want to oversimplify. Interpre-
tation is involved in the effort to discover the physical fact of whether Johnny stabbed
Ritchie and in our ability to determine the answer to that question. Yet the answer it-
self has a real physical existence: either Johnny did that stabbing or someone else did.
But Johnny's mental state-for example, whether he did the stabbing under "extreme
emotional distress" or in fear for his life-literally is an interpretation (although vari-
ous realist facts such as when he bought the knife and what he told the police may
guide that interpretation). Where an interpretation is the reality, Dauberfs ontology
and epistemology fail as useful guides for evidence law.
52. See JAEGwoN KIM, PHLosoOPHY op MmN (1996) (surveying current theories of the
philosophy of mind).
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We expect to prove that Johnny said to himself (thought), "I'm going
to kill you!"" We believe that Johnny thinks this thought when we
prove that he had the purpose, the want, the desire to kill Ritchie.5
Mind as self-conversation-as a linguistic process or activity-is
a concept whose lineage goes back to Plato. In the Theaetetus, Plato
wrote of this conversation between Socrates and an interlocuter:
SOCRATES: ... And do you accept my description of the
process of thinking?
THEAETETUS: How do you describe it?
SOCRATES: As a discourse that the mind carries on within
itself about any subject it is considering.... [WI]hen the
mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself.... So I
should describe thinking as discourse, and judgment as a
statement pronounced, not aloud to someone else, but si-
lently to oneself. 5
Kant similarly wrote that "[e]veryman ... thinks of the cadaver,
which is no longer himself, as himself in the shadowy grave or some-
where else. This illusion cannot be dispelled: it lies in the nature of
thinking as a talking to and about oneself.""6
Our common sense ideas of mind are similarly linguistic. We
have a huge vocabulary of ways to talk to ourselves-believing, medi-
53. See THomAs SzAsz, THE MEANING OF MIND: LANGUAGE, MORALITY, AND NEURO-
ScIENCE (1996) (defending the idea of mind as self-conversation).
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining purpose); see also SzAsz, supra note 53, at x
(arguing that "mind" as self-conversation is the definition most consistent with how
we use the term "mind" in ordinary discourse, law, and psychiatry). Daniel Dennett
concedes that "our kind of mind" is linguistic, but argues that animals and infants,
for example, have less sophisticated "other kinds of minds" or "protominds." See
DANIEL C. DENNEr, KNDS OF MINDS: ToWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF CON-
SCIOuSNESS 1-18, 41-49, 130-33, 146-56, 162 (1996). The only appropriate object
of our knowledge and what is at issue in a criminal trial is our kind of mind-the lin-
guistic mind. Dennett also points out that the ontology (what is)/episremology (our
ability to know what is) distinction collapses in discussions of mind, for how we
know our thoughts affects what they are. See DzNNETr, supra at 2-3. That is why I
have made no special effort to stress this distinction here.
55. Plato, Theactetus, in THE COLLECTE) DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Lane Cooper et al.
trans.) 895-96 (1973).
56. SzAsz, supra note 53, at 19 (quoting Immanuel Kant, Von Erkenntnisvermogen
("Power to know"), in 11 "I. Kant" Werke in 12 Banden 465, 500 (ed. Wilhelm
Weischedel 1964).
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tating, musing, reflecting, pondering, surmising.' When we keep se-
crets, we keep our internal conversation to ourselves." We, therefore,
do not attribute moral agency to those who cannot speak coherently,
to infants, or to the demented, for we do not see them as having a
mind.59 Similarly, in law, one is responsible for one's conduct only if
CCanswerable" for it.6' We are answerable to others and to ourselves, or
more specifically, to our conscience. Remorse, for example, is our in-
ner voice of the self as wicked.61 We treat those who cannot coherently
answer as mindless and therefore not responsible. Mens rea should
thus best be viewed as involving the answering, speaking mind.62
Feminists, however, rarely speak expressly about mind as self-
conversation.63 Rather, feminist debate has centered around an analo-
gous question: whether language determines, or at least strongly
influences, thought.6 Professor Deborah Cameron has summarized
one representative feminist school of thought thus:
Many feminists have made the claim that the names we give
our world are not mere reflections of reality, nor arbitrary la-
bels with no relation to it. Rather, names are a culture's way
of fixing what will actually count as reality in a universe of
overwhelming, chaotic sensations, all pregnant with a mul-
titude of possible meanings.65
This statement effectively defines mind as "autologue," i.e., self-
conversation.
57. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 14.
58. See SzASz, supra note 53, at 9.
59. See SzAsz, supra note 53, atx.
60. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 26.
61. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 47.
62. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 39.
63. See, e.g., DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM & LINGUISTIC THEORY (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter CAMERON, THEORY]; THE FEmINns CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE (Deborah
Cameron ed., 1990) [hereinafter CAMERON, LANGUAGE].
64. See, e.g., CAMERON, THEORY, supra note 63, at 134-57 (summarizing the debates);
DAVID GRADDOL ac JoAN SWANN, GENDER VOICES 134-73 (1992) (discussing the
language/thought/social-reality connection); Maria Black & Rosalind Coward, Lin-
guistic, Social and Sfxual Relations: A Review of Dale Spender's Man Made Language,
in LANGUAGE, supra note 63 (critiquing leading feminist text on language-thought
connection).
65. Deborah Cameron, Introduction: Why is Language a Feminist Issue?, in LANGUAGE,
supra note 63.
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Even other versions of the feminist viewpoint generally agree that
language shapes thought, even if not rigidly determining it. Under
such a view, language does not equal thought but is inextricably
bound up in it.6' We cannot, therefore, know our own thoughts with-
out language. For the practical purposes of the law, this means that
even if "mind" does not literally equal self-conversation, without the
latter we cannot understand the former.
B. The Self A Relational Text
The terms mind, person, and self are related and sometimes used
interchangeably. If we think of mind as a sef-conversation, we must
therefore define the "self" as well. The "self" is often explained in
66. See, e.g., CAmERON, THEORY, supra note 63, at 138 ("Absolute determinism is easily
refuted, but the weaker claim that we are influenced by language structure remains
... of interest."); GRADDOL & SwArM, supra note 64, at 155 ("IThat language
'determines' rather than 'influences' thought is surely discredited. But ... there is
some kind of link between the way language is used and the way people think and re-
act."). For an assessment of the empirical data that abstract language structures (such
as grammar) influence thought, see JOHN A. Lucy, LANGUAGE, DIVEasry, AND
THOUGHT: A REFORMATION OF THE LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY HYPOTHESIS (1992)
(accepting that language has at least some influence on thought, but finding inade-
quate evidence as to what are its influences, how important they are, and when and
how they operate). For a convincing argument that language structures and language
use (e.g., interruption patterns) shape thought and perceptions, see MICHAEL AGAR,
LANGUAGE SHocK: UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURE OF CONVERSATION 61-72, 77-
79, 87, 120-22 (1994). Some theorists view ideology, as expressed in language, as the
primary way in which language influences thought. See, e.g., NoRMAN FAiRCLOuGH,
LANGUAGE AND PowaR 2-5, 33-37 (1989). Some researchers flatly reject
"Whofianism"-the idea that language influences thought-arguing that we all share
a "language instinct," certain biologically-based, universal cognitive-linguistic con-
cepts, so that language variation has little influence on our thoughts. See, e.g., STvEN
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INsTINcT How MIND CRATS LANGUAGE 55-82 (1994).
But see EDWARD M. HuNDERT, LESSONS FROM AN OPTICAL ILLUSION: ON NATURE
AND NURTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES 12-19, 30, 41, 134-36, 167-70 (1995)
(refuting the language instinct theorists by demonstrating a dialogic relationship be-
tween biology, on the one hand, and culture/language on the other). Apart from
empirical data, many philosophers view language and thought as inseparable, see, e.g.,
JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SocIAL REA 1-70, 95-145 (1995) (at
least some facts cannot exist without the human institution of language); JOHN
STEwART, LANGUAGE AS ARTICULATE CONTACT. TowARD A PosT-SEmIoTIc PHiLOso-
PHY OF Co mNIcATIoN 3-32, 103-30 (1995) (language literally constitutes our
world); Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in BAsIC WRITINGS 193 (David F.
Krell ed., 1977) ("Language is the house of Being. In its home [the hu]man dwells."),
a view consistent with the philosophy of mind articulated here.
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terms of both form and function.67 "Form" concerns the laws govern-
ing nonmental or material processes, the realm of determinism."8
"Function" concerns the phenomenal experiences of consciousness
and choice, the realm of agency and individual uniqueness. 69 Karl Jas-
pers has described a similar notion as the tension between
"understanding" and "explanation." 70 Our notions of political free-
dom and citizenship underlying our criminal law indeed depend on
the primacy of function over form, on the assumptions of individual
uniqueness and free will.7' But, we have seen, our willingness to as-
sume freedom of choice and thus accompanying moral responsibility
turns on our capacity for coherent self-conversation. 72Therefore, both
"mind" and "self" ultimately turn on language.
The primary consequence of mind as rooted in language is that
language-and thus both "mind" and the "self"-involves interpreta-
tion. In the first instance, thoughts are acts of self-interpretation. All
our experiences are partly constituted by interpretive assumptions: our
expectations, memories, beliefs, desires, and cultural prejudices.73 A
small woman walking down a darkened'city street has a very different
experience from that of a heavyweight male boxer walking down the
same street.74 Memory itself is an assertion, a self-report, which we
play an active role in constructing. 5 Our memories never involve
solely historical truths, for we seek to create an account of the past
consistent with a preconceived cognitive or moral scheme.76 Memory
67. See DoNA) AuxAMER DowNs, MORE THAN VIcrms 44-45 (1996).
68. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 44-45.
69. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 44-45.
70. KARL JASPERS, GENEr, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 302-03 a. Hoenig & Marian W. Ham-
ilton trans., 1963).
71. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 45. Downs also stresses the flip side of free will-
responsibility, which requires a careful balance in the criminal law between individu-
alization and more general standards of reasonableness. See DowNs, supra note 67, at
182-250. In evidence law terms, he argues for individualized, rather than group, jus-
tice by placing women defendants' lives in their social and experiential context and
then judging them as fully rational human beings. See DowNs, supra note 67, at
198-219, 225-31. For a discussion of the role of individualized justice in evidence
law more generally, see Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 14-30.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
73. See BRmiN FAY, Cot r nxmoRARY P-rLosoPs-Y or Socr. ScmNCE 12-17 (1996).
74. See FAY; supra note 73, at 13.
75. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 47-51.
76. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 49-51.
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is thus at least partly a created narrative.77 "The dependence of mem-
ory on language is consistent with the fact that we have no memories
of our infancy and begin to remember when we begin to talk.
78
The interpretive nature of our thinking extends to emotions as
well. Fear, for example, is both a thought and a feeling.79 The feeling
77. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 50 ("Memory... is a narrative we create-and from
time to time, re-create or 'correct'... to give permanence and validity to our sense of
identity and justify our plans for the future.").
78. See SzAsz, mpra note 53, at 52.
79. See SzAsz, supra note 53, at 110-11. This observation seems counterintuitive. Emo-
tions seem to sweep over us without our control, forces external to ourselves that
capture us in their urgency. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Con-
ceptions ofEmotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLuM. L Ray. 269, 279-80 (1996). This
intuition seems best explained by a mechanistic account of the emotions as
"impulses," "drives," or "unreasoning movements,--"feelings" unconnected to
thinking. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra at 278. Indeed, even pre-verbal infants seem
to us to feel fear, though they lack "thoughts" in the linguistic sense described here.
Few modem philosophers or psychological researchers find the mechanistic view
plausible. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra at 284. Some modern, well-respected mav-
ericks, such as philosopher Paul E. Griffiths, do nevertheless find a core of truth in
the mechanistic view. Griffiths argues that there are a small number of "affect pro-
gram" emotions, emotions that involve facial expressions and autonomic nervous
system reactions unique to those emotions. PAuL E. Girrrrs, WHAT" EMOTIONS
R.YA&.Y ARE 77-78, 83 (1997). Yet, even he concedes that there is often a cognitive
component in the sense that one affect program emotion, fear, is a response to dan-
ger, so we often must first decide that we face danger in order to feel fear. Gwarms,
supra at 89, 92. Sometimes we bypass this evaluative process because we have learned
from past experience to feel fear in a particular situation, despite our present under-
standing that there is no danger. See GmaFnmrs, supra at 92-95. But this observation
itself demonstrates that culture and socialization can play a role even in affect pro-
gram emotions. More importantly, our higher cognitive emotions, such as disgust,
love, or loyalty, are motivational patterns derived from goals, patterns that combine
biological, cultural, and experiential factors. See Giuzmns, supra at 100-01, 104,
118, 120-21, 132-36. Additionally, many lay people describe some emotions as, for
example, anger, when they are experiencing a higher cognitive emotion and not the
affect program emotion of anger. See GaFarrHs, supra at 100-01. Furthermore,
some emotions are socially constructed in the sense that they are actions reinforced by
culture or pretenses that mimic other emotions. See Giupsrras, supra at 137-67.
Even Griffiths concedes, therefore, strong cognitive and cultural components to most
of our emotions.
A better conception of emotions is "evaluative." Under this conception,
thoughts about an object are integral to emotions. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra at
285-97. We cannot, therefore, feel grief without mentioning the object toward
which it is directed. Thus grief must stem from a belief, such as a woman's belief that
her child is dead. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra. All such beliefs involve appraisals of
the object as significant or valuable. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra. That recognition
of the object's importance to us explains the sense of externally imposed urgency that
we associate with emotions. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra at 288-89. Moreover, the
beliefs are a constituent part of the emotions, for "[tlo separate pity from fear, fear
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or physiological experience involves a quickened heart, a racing pulse,
a sweating brow. But is this experience excitement, anticipation, fear,
or a combination? We identify it as fear when we name it. Experience
and knowledge of our thoughts and feelings are thus not the same
thing. We "know" something only when we can identify, describe,
and explain it." Knowledge involves being able to say something
about the object of that knowledge. Consequently, every feeling and
thought must be interpreted."
But such interpretation is an inherently social act. The isolated,
autonomous self of liberal individualism does not exist." Take a
child's learning the simple distinction between an "apple" and a
from grief, we cannot rely on the felt quality of the pain alone; only an inspection of
the characteristic thought patterns allows us to discriminate." Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra at 293. To recognize that emotions necessarily have evaluations as a constituent
component is not to deny, however, that habit and biology play roles as well. See Ka-
han & Nussbaum, supra at 296.
The evaluative view is also at work in both the theory and practice of the crimi-
nal law, although often alongside the mechanistic view. See Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra at 304-46. As one example, common law manslaughter requires not simply
provocation but provocation by the victim. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra at 306.
The jury must thus make a determination that the defendant's passion was directed
toward a particular object, a cognitive component of the emotion. Similarly, the
common law might mitigate murder to manslaughter where a woman is provoked by
her husband's abusing her daughter but not a killing provoked by homophobia, the
type of perceived provocation (a cognitive matter) thus being key. See Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra at 312-13. Furthermore, even where the law seems to ignore cog-
nitive components of emotions, juries often will not do so. See Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra at 330-31 (juries care about what kinds of thoughts prompt the fear involved
in self-defense).
Finally, it is important to distinguish the experience of emotions from
"knowing" them. As just explained, emotions can be a complex blend of physiological
reaction, cognitive beliefs, individual experiences, social expectations, and cultural
training. We cannot make sense of this mass of data without words, but coming up
with the right words of course involves us in interpretation.
80. See FAY, supra note 73, at 18-19.
81. See FAY, supra note 73, at 20.
82. See FAY, supra note 73, at 19.
83. See FAY, supra note 73, at 18-19 ("Every experience is like a sign whose meaning
must be derived from seeing how it is connected to other experiences .... Knowl-
edge of what we are experiencing always involves an interpretation of these
experiences.").
84. See Wst, supra note 28, at 281 ("[The particular 'self' familiar to modem, liberal
society... [is] arbitrarily desirous, sated by pleasure, [and] sovereign over one's own'
subjectivity.... ."); Susan J. Brison, Outliving Oneself Trauma, Memory, and Personal
Identity, in Fsmmsrs RLrmnx mE SELF, supra note 28, at 12, 14 ("Most traditional
accounts of the self.., have been individualistic,... independent of... social con-
text. .. .- )
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"tomato." Both are round, red, and edible. To distinguish between
them, the child must learn to attend to other differences as salient
ones and to attach names to those differences."5 That learning comes
from family, friends, teachers, and caretakers, from the child's rela-
tionship to others." If such basic concepts as "apple" and "tomato" are
partly defined by others, this is even more so for more complex con-
cepts relevant to self-identity. Whether we consider ourselves kind or
grumpy, smart or average, religious or secular depends upon moral,
intellectual, and spiritual concepts learned from others.
Susan Brison put it this way:
[F]eminist accounts of the self have focused on the ways in
which the self is formed in relation to others and sustained
in a social context. On these accounts, persons are, in An-
nette Baier's words, "second persons"-that is, "essentially
successors, heirs to other persons who formed and cared for
them."... [T]he self... [is] related to and constructed by
others ... not only because others continue to shape and
define us throughout our lifetimes but also because our own
sense of self is couched in descriptions whose meanings are
social phenomena. 7
The self, however, exists not merely in relation to other individuals
but to groups and institutions. The fluid self is so permeable that oth-
ers are in fact part of you."8 Indeed, our most common intentions
depend upon others. You cannot intend to marry without the social
institution of marriage, nor feel shame but in a real or imagined rela-
tionship to others.8 9 You cannot intend to steal without the institution
85. The example is my own but is suggested by Kim, supra note 52, at 193-94, which
discusses the related, albeit still different, notion of "wide content": most of our be-
liefs and desires depend partly upon the external world, involving more than simply
what goes on in our heads.
86. See FAY, supra note 73, at 30-48 (critiquing "atomism," which is the thesis that the
basic units of social life are self-contained, essentially independent, and separated en-
tities).
87. Brison, supra note 84, at 14. Brison goes on to argue that even autonomy can be
conceived in relational terms and that autonomy, embodiment, and narrative are but
different aspects of the self. See Brison, supra note 84, at 14-32.
88. See FAY, supra note 73, at 39.
89. See FAY, supra note 73, at 39-41; SHARON LAMB, THE TROuBLE wrrH BwME: VIC-
TIMs, PERPETRATORS, & ResPONSMMIY 141 (1996) ("Since the feeling of exposure is
so central to the experience of shame, one can understand Helen Block Lewis's asser-
tion that an individual can only experience shame in the context of an emotional
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of property. ° Thus, most intentions come from social practices.9'
Furthermore, our social identity-our sense of who we are and what
we are worth-is intimately bound up with our group memberships.
92
Are we male or female? Black or white? Jewish or Christian? Republi-
can or Democrat? Our attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions are thus in
part shaped by the groups with which we identify.93 Our self-
interpretations therefore necessarily incorporate group interpretive
schemes.
C. Can We 'Know" Our Thoughts? The Problems of Confsed
Thinking and the Unconscious Mind
The interpretive act of determining our mental state is social in
another sense: we often are not the only ones doing the interpreting.
Often we do not know what it is we are thinking or feeling. We have
trouble naming our thoughts and emotions. For example, is a decision
to take a new job for you, or to please others, or both, and, if both, to
what degree?9 We also may not feel confident in assessing our own
motives: "[T]o discover the nature of complex mental states requires
subtle interpretation and a deep sense of the ways we often mislead
ourselves to make ourselves look better."96 We may be "too enmeshed
relationship with another person, and only when he or she values that other person's
opinions.").
90. See FAY, supra note 73, at 40.
91. See FAY, supra note 73, at 41. Hegel powerfully captured the social nature of the
related concept of self-consciousness as involving the 'need for recognition": our
sense of self turns on recognition by others. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THn SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., 1977); see also FAY, supra note 73, at 44-45
(explaining why even such primal feelings as desire are inherently social).
92. See RUPERT BROWN, GRoUP PROCESSES 20 (1988).
93. See, e.g., RUPERT BROWN, PREJuDICE: ITs SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 86 (1995)
("[S]tereotypes are rooted in the web of social relations between groups and do not
derive solely... from the workings of our cognitive systems.... "); PAuL HARRIS,
BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAw (1997) (summarizing criminal cases in which
common group experiences and identity were central to understanding individuals'
mental states); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward FeministJurisprudence, 34 STA. L
REv. 703, 717-18 n.73 (1980) ("[A] man never attacks a woman as an individual,
nor does she ever respond as such.").
94. See generally JODY DAvID ARmouR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RAcisM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS O1 BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997) (recounting the psychological
processes by which white interpretive schemes mold racist perceptions and actions).
95. See FAY, supra note 73, at 18-20.
96. FAY, supra note 73, at 19.
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in the flow" of our lives, too lacking in distance, to name our
thoughts.' We may be ambivalent, desiring and spurning simultane-
ously, leaving us confused; we may deceive ourselves out of fear, guilt,
or self-protection.98 Thus, we may turn to others, who may offer in-
sights that we lack due to their wider view and distance, to detect
patterns, influences, and effects that escape us."
Yet this acknowledgement-that we may sometimes need to turn
to others to divine our mental states-involves a subtle shift in my
argument, a shift that has shown up periodically throughout this Arti-
cle. If there are thoughts and feelings that we cannot name, then how
can "mind" equal internalized talk? There must, therefore, be
thoughts that do not involve language."
Several responses are possible. One is that experiences of dis-
comfort or confusion are not thoughts but some other kind of mental
phenomenon.'0 ' We wrestle with these experiences until we come up
with language to describe them, and it is that language that is a
thought. A second response is to accept that there is such an entity as
the unconscious mind.'0 2 That entity manifests itself to us in dreams,
images, vague feelings, slips of the tongue, and odd behaviors. Yet we
cannot know what these signals mean without interpreting them,
which means translating them into words.0 3 This argument is a varia-
tion of the point made earlier that to experience something and to
"know" it are two different things. We "know" only by naming.' ° A
third response is to remember that feelings can involve both thought
and nonthought elements, the former always involving language.' 5
Each of these responses relies on one of two (or both) strategies: de-
97. FAY, supra note 73, at 21.
98. See FAY, supra note 73, at 21-22.
99. See FAY, supra note 73, at 21-24.
100. Cf MARCIA CAvWLL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MIND: FROM FREUD TO PHILOSOPHY 39,
174 (1993) (conceding that there may be some pre-verbal thoughts that are not flly
formed, yet ultimately defending the idea that there are no "thoughts" in the strong
sense of the word without language and that the "mind" is inherently social).
101. See COLIN McGrN, THE CHARAcrER OF MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF MIND 84 (2d ed. 1997) (proposing that thought as language can refer
only to propositional attitudes, not to all mental states).
102. See KIM, supra note 52, at 158 ("[The existence of unconscious mental states, in-
cluding beliefs, of which the subject is not aware, is now widely recognized."). But see
SzAsz, supra note 53, at 111 (arguing that "the unconscious" is a fiction).
103. See CAvEL., supra note 100, at 174 (describing part of the psychoanalyst's task as
helping the patient to render articulate those mental states that are not yet so).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
105. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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fining away the problem or conceding its existence but noting that
interpretation is nevertheless always involved under any theory of the
mind. This last point is ultimately the one on which my argument
depends. In any event, even those philosophers finding flaws with the
idea of mind as an autologue concede that they have yet to offer any-
thing better for the practical purposes that matter to most people.' 6
Moreover, the concept of mind as internal talk is closest to our com-
monsense and legal notions. '° For all these reasons, it is simpler and
more practical to speak of mind as self-conversation. That conversa-
tion necessarily involves interpretation and words whose sounds we
may sometimes hear only when others join in.
D. The Jury: Fusing Horizons
In criminal trials, this involvement of others in interpreting our
complex mental states is both necessary and no longer a matter of
choice. The jury,"0 8 not the defendant, decides what was in the defen-
dant's "mind." Under an intentionalist theory of meaning, of course,
the defendant has a single mental state that the jury must uncover."
But the passage of time and differences between the defendant's and
the jurors' experiences necessarily mean that jurors must translate the
defendant's actions into the jurors' own terms. Moreover, the defen-
dant's acts will have effects that may have a different meaning for
jurors than for criminal actors. Ultimately, therefore, jurors will create
meaning from the interaction between author (suspect) and inter-
preter (jury).'10 This is the central insight of Gadamerian hermeneu-
tics."' The defendant's own intention must be plumbed because it
106. Professor McGinn, after cataloguing the strengths and weaknesses of the argument
that thought is language, unsuccessfully struggles with the problem of then deter-
mining what thought and its building blocks, concepts, are. See McGn-N, supra note
101, at 106. Whatever they may be, they will require interpretation and translation
into words. So for the practical purposes of the law, both self- and other-knowledge
of the mind are linguistic.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 52-66.
108. The arguments in this Part also apply when the court acts as factfinder, i.e., in a
bench trial. In arguments to be made later in this piece, however, I will argue for a
feminist preference for jury, rather than judicial, factfinding, though much of the dis-
cussion here applies to both contexts. See infra Part III.
109. See FAY, supra note 73, at 138.
110. See FAY, supra note 73, at 142-47. The "author" of courtroom trial texts also in-
dudes, of course, the advocates through whom the suspect and others often speak.
111. See FAY, supra note 73, at 142-47.
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defines the object toward which jurors will direct their interpretive
energies, so there is some truth in intentionalism." 2 But meaning un-
avoidably is determined by a fusion between the conceptual worlds of
the defendant and the jurors." When jurors name a mental state as
"premeditation," "heat of passion," or a "belief in the imminent need
to use deadly force in self-defense," they are crafting an interpretation
that partly embodies their own assumptions, attitudes, and beliefs.
Mental-state determination, therefore, ultimately involves other-
conversation (between jury and defendant or victim) as well as self-
conversation. Knowing a mental state thus involves a socially con-
structed, communal process, the implications of which are explored in
Parts II through V below.
E. Tentative Conclusions
What are the consequences for expert testimony of viewing the
determination of mental state as a linguistic, interpretive act, partly, in
a sense, a communal literary event? If mental state is for all practical
purposes an interpretation, will any interpretation do? And what, if
anything, can experts offer that lay witnesses cannot? The mere mention
of the literary raises specters of Professor Faigman's Dostoyevskean psy-
chologist, the psychologist who purports to obtain his insights from
fictional novels rather than the controlled scientific study of human
nature."14 Must that specter haunt the courtroom?
More complete answers to these questions-especially those con-
cerning how to screen implausible from plausible interpretations-
must await later sections of this Article and its companion. For now, I
will make six preliminary points: first, we must distinguish proving
mental state itself from proving mental state as a reflection of physical
reality; second, interpretation necessarily involves an understanding of
the narrative coherence of human lives; third, because juries partici-
pate in constructing interpretive mental state, understanding experts'
112. See FAY, supra note 73, at 148-51.
113. See FAY, supra note 73, at 152-53; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method andthe Federal Rules ofEvidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARv.
J. LExis. 329 (1995) [hereinafter Taslitz, Interpretive Method] (providing an example
of how the hermeneutic approach can be applied to written as well as human "texts").
114. See David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawryer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of
Evidentiay Munificence, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 817, 821 n.10 (1996) (likening some
aspects of social science to literature and suggesting that "the work of Feodor Dosto-
evsky was at least as scientific as much Freudian-based psychology").
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roles requires understanding a feminist jury's nature and function;
fourth, experts can provide information regarding a defendant's group
membership and social circumstances necessary to a fuller under-
standing of the social self; fifth, interpretive social science, which
arguably includes psychiatry, has important insights to offer that Pop-
perian social science cannot;" 5 and sixth, experts can help to narrow
the gap between a defendant's and a juror's interpretive frameworks in
ways that serve the political goals of evidence law. These tentative
conclusions are more fully explained and defended below.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AuTOLOGUE
Part I of this Article argued that mental states are autologues
("self-conversations"), a kind of interpretive act. Part II examines the
implications of this insight. Part II begins by comparing proof of
mental state itself (an interpretive act) with mental state as circum-
stantial proof of a physical reality (and thus not an interpretive act).
The latter needs to be judged by the standards of traditional science.
Part II then explores the nature of human lives as narratives, a fact
that alters our understanding of the role of social science experts and
our conception of the jury, This reconception of the jury, explored in
greater depth in Part III, alters our notions of when jurors should hear
115. Sir Karl Popper argued that demarcation of "science" from non-science was to be
judged by the criterion of "falsifiability":
[A] system is to be considered scientific only if it makes assertions which
may clash with observations; and a system is, in fact, tested by attempts to
produce such dashes, that is to say, by attempts to refute it. Thus testabil-
ity is the same as refutability, and can therefore likewise be taken as a
criterion of demarcation.
KARL PoPPER, CoNpEruRE & REPATONS 256 (1965). The principal proponent
of Popperian philosophy in evidence law is Professor David Faigman. See, e.g., David
Faigman, To Have and Have Not:. Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as
Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989) [hereinafter Faigman, To Have and
Have Not]. For a contrary view, see Adina Schwartz, A "Dogma of Empiricism Revis-
ited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HAv. J.L. & TECH. 149 (1997).
Popper's views on the scientific demarcation problem were but one part of a more
comprehensive, relatively consistent worldview. See PAUL DIsMNG, How DOES So-
CItA. SCIENCE WoRm? 29-54 (1991). For purposes of this artide, I will use the term
"Popperian science" to refer to the notion of falsifiability as the science/non-science
demarcation criterion. The wisdom of Popper's views on this question and on his
general worldview will be considered in the companion piece. That piece will argue
in part that Popper's views were quintessentially patriarchal.
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evidence and for what purposes. These revised understandings are ex-
plored in Part IV in the context of battered woman's syndrome, an
example that introduces several new concepts, including the "acute
observer," "evidentiary richness," overcoming cognitive blinders, and
valuing interpretive social science." 6 These new concepts set the stage
for exploring, in Part V, the legitimate role that politics can play in
evidence law.
A. The Purposes for Which Proof ofMental State Is Offered
To understand the argument made here, we must separate two
different uses of mental states at trial: mental states as themselves ele-
ments of a crime or defense versus mental states as circumstantial
proof of physical facts. The latter use is better judged by more tradi-
tional approaches to scientific evidence. I offer three illustrations in
this section.
1. Recovered Memories
Jurors are asked to determine whether a belief accurately reflects
what happened to an individual. Suppose, for example, that a psy-
chologist wants to testify that, with her aid, a patient has "recovered"
long-buried memories of being sexually abused by her father. In such
cases, the sincerity of the patient is rarely questioned. The parties con-
cede that the patient believes that she was sexually abused and that her
father was the offender."' The prosecution thus tries to use the mental
116. See infia text accompanying notes 260-320. One need not necessarily be a feminist
to accept many of the arguments that I make here. These arguments were, however,
inspired by feminist thinkers, whose voices too often are silenced when the intellec-
tual debt owed to them is not paid. Moreover, I see the position that I stake out here
as a small piece in a larger project committed to achieving a more balanced, caring so-
cial order truly committed to equal dignity and respect for all. That project is one I
best understand as the feminist one, though other types of thinkers also contribute to
similar projects. To those who would ask, "Need I buy into your notions of feminism
or patriarchy to accept your distinctions as useful?" I therefore reply, "No, but you
will be much poorer for it." See Andrew E. Taslitz, Speech at the Evidence Section
Presentation of the Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting (Jan. 9,
1998) (draft on file with the Michiganfournal of Gender & Law) (explaining why not
every feminist insight need be unique to feminism for this movement to offer much
of value to evidence law and scholarship).
117. See EuzABzm Losrus & Kxwrum KETcHum, THE MrTH oF REx',ssED MEM
onv: FALsE MEMoRIES & ALLEOATIONS OF SEXuALABusE (1994).
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state of belief or memory as proof of a physical act-sexual abuse-by
a particular person.
We have already seen that memory is continually reconstructed
by each of us."' Memory does not work like a camera taking a photo-
graph."9 Much social science research indeed demonstrates that
memories can be highly inaccurate reflections of the physical world
precisely because of their creative, constructed character.20 Whether a
child's genitals were touched and by whom are not interpretive ques-
tions. The touching either happened or it did not, and if it did, then
either the father did it or did not. The existence of the criminal act is
not an interpretive question, even though interpretive schemas (such
as jurors' assumptions about the likelihood of abuse and about chil-
dren being truthful) may affect the jury's ability to answer the
question accurately. Careful inquiry must thus be made into all the
Daubert factors and into the concerns of traditional, realist science.' 2'
2. Eyewitnesses
Eyewitness testimony offers a second example. When an eyewit-
ness says, "that is the man who robbed Johnny; I will never forget that
face," the eyewitness reports a memory and his belief in the memory's
accuracy. Apart from understanding the memory process, however, we
must also understand the perceptual process-the factors that affect
our ability to perceive accurately the physical world. Much insightful
experimental work has been done on the accuracy of eyewitness testi-
mony, that is, on whether the witness' beliefs about the physical world
are true." The value and generalizability of that work should largely
118. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
119. See LoFTUS & KETcaWM, supra note 117.
120. See LoFrus & KETcmM, supra note 117.
121. See Faigman, Socidal Science, supra note 6, at 961, 965-79 (concluding, under
Dauberfs criteria and realist ontology and epistemology, that research is too specula-
tive and anecdotal to justify admitting expert testimony that a witness remembering a
.repressed" event is in fact remembering what truly happened).
122. See, e.g., BRIAN L CUTLER & STVEN PENROD, MisTAKxE IDENTFCATION: THE
EYEmWITNSS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995) (critically analyzing the recent work
in this area); ANDRaw E. TAs=Z & MARcARET L PARIS, CONsTrrumoNAn CamnsuL
PROCEDURE 705-09 (1997) (summarizing research).
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be judged by the degree to which it complies with the standards of
good traditionalist, realist science.'2'
3. Group Character Evidence
A further example concerns "group character evidence," expert
testimony explicitly comparing the personality traits of an individual
to those typical of members of a certain group.'24 Group character evi-
dence might be used to prove a criminal act. For example, one might
argue that a defendant fits a "batterer's profile" and, therefore, is more
likely to have battered his wife than is someone who does not fit the
profile. 125 This argument can, of course, be framed in purely behav-
ioral terms that circumvent mental state entirely: those fitting profiles
are, in almost neo-Pavlovian fashion, simply more likely (like a dog
salivating upon seeing food) to behave in a particular way (to batter)
given the right stimulus (a longstanding romantic relationship). 2
Juries are, however, likely also to reason thus: men fitting the
profile want control, so this male battered his wife to achieve con-
trol.' Juries will posit an intermediate mental state as necessary to a
coherent understanding of how, why, and when a man might batter.
21
Mental state, I have argued, is an interpretive act. But mental state'
here is being used to prove a physical fact-battering. We arguably
need to know much about the predictive validity of such mental states
before we can confidently so use batterers' profiles. Expert testimony
123. Note my use of the plural, "standards." I do so to make dear that I do not believe
that there is necessarily one uniform criteria across all fields for what is good, tradi-
tionalist science. See Taslitz, FeministApproach Revisited, supra note 7.
124. See Robert P. Mostelher, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidenc Law,
46 DuKE LJ. 461, 462 (1996) (using similar definition); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra
note 23, at 25 (defining group character evidence).
125. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: -The Role of Batterers'Profiles and Ex-
pert "Social Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Wolence, 68 U.
CoLo. L REv. 147, 152-62, 170-78 (1997) [hereinafter Raeder, Batterers' Profiles]
(cataloguing uses of batterers' profiles); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 9-14
(cataloguing uses of group character evidence).
126. See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 25-27, 46 (explaining that group character
uses do not necessarily depend on mental-state inferences).
127. See Raeder, Batterers' Profiles, supra note 125, at 153, 170 (recounting the 0. J.
Simpson prosecutors' efforts to establish his motive for killing Nicole Brown Simpson
as rooted in the psychology of battering, behavior involving violence rather than
control).
128. See Taslitz, MysefAlone, supra note 23, at 94-98 (illustrating how jurors' need for
narrative coherence leads them to posit mental states to explain behavior).
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that sought to use the expert's expertise as direct support for both the
existence of a particular mental state and the consequent occurrence of
a particular physical act would need, therefore, to meet the standards
of traditional science, at least as to the latter question. A different re-
sult arguably might be called for if the expert purports only to be
helpful in proving mental state and leaves inferences of an act there-
from to lay sensibilities.
This last example differs from the first two examples in important
ways. The posited intermediate mental state in a batterer's case is
likely to be central to the jury's determination whether an act oc-
curred. Unless the jury understands why a man might batter his
spouse, the jury may be unwilling to believe that an unprovoked hus-
band would seriously beat, even kill, his wife. 29 That unwillingness
might stem from the jury's ignorance about the social dynamics of
battering. 30 But battering occurs in a human relationship, so juries
must understand not merely isolated batterers, but battering relation-
ships.'3' That social knowledge-and very feminist emphasis on the
importance of social relationships 3 2 -combined with historical in-
formation about this particular relationship, is central to an informed
interpretation of the evidence of mental state. Unlike the first two ex-
amples, therefore, there will be a serious dispute over what the
defendant's mental state was, a dispute whose resolution might be
aided by evidence of social context. In theory, that expert evidence
might be limited solely to proving mental state, an interpretive ques-
tion. Jurors would then be free to make the lay inference that someone
with a particular mental state was more likely to commit a particular
act. That latter lay inference would not involve using expert testimony
to prove a physical fact, namely the criminal act. In practice, however,
the situation is more complex.
The rub is that a jury might misuse contextual social science in-
formation about who batters and why to prove the act directly, rather
than to interpret an intermediate mental state; that is, the jurors might
use the information in a probabilistic fashion (the neo-Pavlovian rea-
129. See Tastliz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23.
130. See Raeder, Batterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 181-82 (documenting juror igno-
rance about the psychodynamics of battering).
131. See Raeder, Baterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 161.
132. See WEST, supra note 28, at 50-61 (stressing relationships as central to feminism).
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soning above).' 33 Moreover, the jurors may do so even if both the ex-
pert and the court tell the jurors to limit the expert testimony solely to
the existence of a purported mental state. Reasoning that certain kinds
of men batter, that the defendant is of this kind, and that therefore he
battered is character-based reasoning to prove conduct, reasoning ex-
pressly barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 404.'m
It may be hard to separate out the extent to which a jury uses so-
cial context to interpret mental state versus probabilistic reasoning.
The danger of the latter dominating is probably greatest when the so-
cial science evidence is presented by the prosecution in the form of a
profile, which purports to describe particular batterers and to predict
behavior.' This danger will be especially great where there is then
evidence that this defendant fit that profile.
Even if the jury can initially focus on mental state, that focus re-
mains but one step in a character-based reasoning process-
personality as circumstantial evidence of mental state that in turn be-
comes circumstantial evidence of an act. Rule 404 generally prohibits
this process. 36 It will thus be hard for jurors to avoid ultimately using
the expert's profile about a particular defendant to prove his act.
Nonprofile social context evidence relevant to mental state
arguably might avoid this trap. The argument would be that
prosecutors are focusing on the dynamics of this particular batterer
and battered relationship, which can only be understood as part of a
broader social context.137 Jurors should not conclude, therefore, that
the defendant committed these acts because he is a bad person, but
rather because he is part of a relationship in which he wanted control.
This use of mental-state evidence would be more akin to admissible
motive than inadmissible character.33 This line between motive and
character is imprecise and admittedly sometimes thin, but, if accepted,
133. See Raeder, Batterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 160-62, 180 (noting the danger of
such juror abuses); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 26-27 (defining probabil-
istic prediction).
134. FED. R. Evan. 404(a). See Raeder, Batterers' Profil, supra note 125, at 161-62
(noting this argument as to batterers' profiles); Taslitz, MysefAlone, supra note 23, at
44-48 (applying a similar argument to al group-based character evidence).
135. See Raeder, Batterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 160-62, 179-80.
136. See FED. P- EVID. 404; Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 44-48.
137. See Raeder, Batterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 161-62, 178-84; Myrna S. Raeder,
The Admissibility ofPyior Acts ofDomestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CA L
REv. 1463 (1996).
138. Compare Raeder, Batterers'Profiles, supra note 125, at 161, 170 (motive-like use of
group character), with Taslitz, MysefAone, supra note 23, at 108-09 (habit).
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the focus on mental state ("motive") calls for a different set of
admissibility standards than does a focus on probabilistic proof of an
139
act.
Nevertheless, the bottom line of this discussion remains: any time
that we seek to prove mental state as an inferential step in a chain
purporting to prove an act, we risk the jury's using expert testimony
in a probabilistic fashion that the data might not support. There will
be close cases, however, where we might still trust the jury to use ex-
pert evidence of mental state solely for that purpose, but we must be
cautious. Only where the act is admitted, so that we are proving
mental state plain and simple, can this extra bit of caution be aban-
doned.
4. Mental State, Plain and Simple
A batiered woman might admit that she killed her husband. She
would argue, however, that she did so believing she faced imminent
danger of serious bodily injury under circumstances that to
nonbattered observers do not seem so fraught with danger.' Because
only her mental state is at issue, expert testimony should be judged for
its value in aiding the jury in interpreting that mental state.' Both
traditional science-judged under a different standard-and
interpretive social science will thus be of value. 4 2 Social science
139. See supra Part I & infra Part IV (outlining initial admissibility guidelines stemming
from the realization that "mental state" is a socially constructed interpretation, rather
than a thing "out there" waiting to be discovered).
140. SeeTaslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 11-12.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 36-121 (discussing the interpretive nature of
mental state). Complex issues surround determining precisely how best to help the
jury understand the plight of battered women. Some have argued, for example, that
informing the jury on the general socio-psychological dynamics of battering is wiser
than relying on a battered woman "syndrome," which rests on arguably flawed meth-
ods, portrays women in stereotypical fashion, and works against abused women who
do not quite fit the "syndrome" typology. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged
Sword- Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. CoLo. L Rnv. 789 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder,
Double-Edged Sword]. Further light is shed on these issues infra text accompanying
notes 199-212.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 260-320. In addition to proving acts or mental
states, there is a third use of expert social science evidence at trial-supporting a wit-
ness' credibility. I have not addressed this use in text because the analysis is
straightforward and has been done effectively by others. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra
note 124. Briefly, where social science is used purely to describe general reactions to
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evidence as to mental state plain and simple will have one special
value in particular-to reveal the narrative coherence of human lives.
B. The Narrative Coherence ofHuman Lives
The literary mind is not a separate kind of mind. It is our
mind. The literary mind is the fundamental mind. '
Our minds engage in two types of thought: propositional and
narrative thinking.'" While "propositional thinking is logical, ab-
stract, context-independent, theoretical, and formal, narrative
thinking is concrete, interpersonal, situational, and descriptive of re-
ality.' 45 It is narrative thinking that dominates our conceptions of the
selfi "Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and hating,
are guided by narrative plots.""4
6
Narrative realists argue indeed that our lives consist of narrative
structures.147 Intentions exist only in historical settings, and we are the
consistent refashioning of the historically situated narratives that we
tell about ourselves.' However, stories consist not only of our actions
known or assumed causes to support credibility, little is asked of the underlying sci-
ence. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 472-78. For example, a child abuse victim
might be impeached by defense counsel's showing on cross-examination a long delay
in the child's reporting the alleged abuse. The prosecution might then offer expert
testimony explaining that children who are in fact sexually abused often delay re-
porting the abuse. This minimal claim can be supported at a high level of generality
despite significant Popperian flaws in the science. We need not show that predictions
of credibility can be made about any spedfic child. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at
472-78.
A fourth use-using expert testimony to prove that conduct was reasonable-is
discussed infia note 207 and accompanying text.
143. MAxC TuRNER, THE LrAmRY MInD at vi (1996).
144. See JERomE BRUNER, AcruL MINDs, PossxBLE Woaws 11-14 (1986); see alto P.C.
Vitz, The Use of Stories in Moral Development:. New Psychological Reasons for an Old
Education Method, 45 Am. PSYCHOL 709, 709-10 (1990).
145. Noa.,A J. FINnmL, CommoNsENsE JusncE 69 (1995) (interpreting Bruner's work
on the subject).
146. Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphorf r Psychology, in NtaAUTXvE
PsYcHoLOGY.: THE STOmn NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore t Sar-
bin ed., 1986).
147. See FAY, supra note 73, at 179 (explaining that "It]rue stories are found, not con-
structed").
148. See FAY, supra note 73, at 182. Three features of intentional acts make storytelling a
condition for being able to perform any intentional acts whatsoever. Intentional acts
are (1) directed toward an end, (2) motivated by a reason, and (3) necessarily look
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and intentions, but also of their results and the significance that others
ascribe to them. 9 We may ourselves reassess that significance over
time. So we simultaneously live stories and have them imposed on us
by others. ' The stories we live happen in interpretive communities,
in groups of shared meanings.5 1 For others to understand our stories,
therefore, they need to know our communities as well as our life expe-
riences.
52
The tales we (suspects, victims, and witnesses) tell at trial seek to
bring jurors' narratives about us in line with our own. 153 To do so, we
need powerful stories that can communicate the nature and extent of
physical and psychic injuries in a way that description and logical ar-
gument cannot.' 4 We must also debunk stock stories, preconceived
tales resident in jurors' minds that may block other narratives from
being heard.' Confronting jurors with another's own history and
stance can reveal the apparent objectivity of the dominant tales as
anything but aperspectival, and can dislodge old understandings to
make room for the new.56 "[Sitories by their very nature... appeal to
what is, by convention, ... taboo .... ""
Stories also convey "rational emotion," emotion that is properly
part of reasoning.15' The reason/emotion dichotomy is false.5 9
toward the future. See FAY, supra note 73, at 191-92. Intentional acts thus look to
your situation and how you got there in order to determine where you are going, all
elements of a good story. See FAY, supra note 73, at 191-92.
149. See FAY, supra note 73, at 184-90.
150. See FAY, supra note 73, at 194-96. This philosophy of social science middle ground
between "narrative realism" (we are the stories we tell about ourselves) and "narrative
constructivism" (stories are imposed on us by interpreters) is called "narrativism."
151. See FAY, supra note 73, at 140-51, 189, 195-96.
152. See FAY, supra note 73, at 50-70, 155-77 (noting that we must understand a person's
group membership, his unique and particular life circumstances and nature, and the
universal laws of human nature to understand that person's meanings and actions).
153. Alternatively, we try to see that the stories that juries form about us are at least in-
formed by the stories that we (the trial participants) tell about ourselves.
154. See WEsT, supra note 28, at 208-11. West lists reasons why feminist jurisprudence.
often takes narrative form, but these reasons equally well explain the value of libera-
tory storytelling at trial.
155. See Wms, supra note 28 at 211-12. See generally Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra
note 15 (defending the existence of, and the need to counter, patriarchal cultural rape
tales).
156. See Wmst, supra note 28, at 213-15.
157. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 33 (1984).
158. See MATHA C. NussAum, PoETIC JusrcE 62-63 (1995).
159. See NussBAum, supra note 158, at 55-72 (rebutting the standard objections to emo-
tions' having a role to play in public judgment).
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Emotions consist of both feelings and accompanying beliefs.l 6° "To
tell whether a certain pain is fear or grief, we have to inspect the
beliefs that are bound up in the experience. '  Cognitive science
indeed demonstrates that reason cannot happen without emotions and
feelings.' 62 Emotion also recognizes our interconnectedness to others, a
central part of the "self." 63 Only by making a jury feel a defendant's
(or, in appropriate cases, such as rape, a victim's) emotions can the
jury engage in "fancy," the ability to see one thing in terms of
another.'" Such emotions need not be unfairly prejudicial; rather,
they are part of the jury's sound assessment of the evidence." 5 Adam
Smith's notion of the "judicious spectator" makes this clear.'"
The judicious spectator is not personally involved in what he
witnesses, so his emotions and thoughts do not relate to his well-
being. He is thus unbiased and somewhat detached.'67 He may, how-
ever, draw on his own personal history. But in doing so,
160. See NussBAuM, supra note 158, at 60-63.
161. NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 61-62.
162. See, e.g., ANToNoR. DAMAsIo, D S.cARTES' ERRoR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THP
HUMAN BEAIN (1994). Irrational emotions are, therefore, those based on false or in-
appropriate beliefs, but "in no case will emotions be irrational in the sense of being
totally cut off from cognition and judgment." NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 63. In-
terestingly, one of the key ways that emotion aids cognition is by telling us what to
value and by how much. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 63-72. For a more recent
detailed defense of the role of emotions in criminal law specifically, see Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 79.
163. Compare NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 63-72 (explaining that even under a liberal
notion of the self, emotions properly enter into public judgment by emphasizing our
interrelatedness), with supra text accompanying notes 67-94 (defending a more per-
meable, social notion of the self). See also Diana Tietjens Meyers, Emotions and
Heterodox Moral Perception, in FEamlsTs RrmmNx mn SaS.', supra note 28, at 197-
214 (understanding that disparaged emotional attitudes, such as hypersensitivity and
paranoia, are feminist epistemic virtues that reveal the poverty of an individualistic
view of moral identity).
164. See CHAmm.s DicKaNs, HARD Tm s 1-26, 202 (1981); NussmuM, supra note 158,
at 36-52 (illustrating philosophical power of "fancy"). "Fancy" must usually be di-
rected to the criminal defendant because it is generally his thoughts and emotions, his
mental state, that is at issue. In some cases, such as rape, which requires the victim's
nonconsent, the law arguably makes the victim's thoughts and emotions relevant too.
See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 422-24 (comparing "subjective" and
"objective" notions of consent in rape cases).
165. See NussAUM, supra note 158, at 72-78.
166. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 72-78.
167. See NussBAUM, supra note 158, at 72-78.
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[T]he spectator must ... endeavour, as much as he can to
put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home
to himself every little circumstance of distress which can pos-
sibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of
his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to
render as perfect as possible that imaginary change of situa-
tion upon which his sympathy is founded.
161
Thus, both empathic participation and external assessment are
necessary for such a spectator.1 69 But not all emotions promote sound
judgment. The emotion must be one "informed by a true view of
what is going on-of the facts of the case, of their significance for the
actors in the situation, and of any dimensions of their true significance
or importance that may elude or be distorted in the actors' own con-
sciousness." 70 The emotions must also be those that still permit
168. ADAM SMrr, THE THEORY OF MoRAn SEt'nrmrs 22 (1774).
169. See Nussmum, supra note 158, at 73-74.
170. NussnmuM, supra note 158, at 74. It is important to comment on Nussbaum's use of
the word "true" in this quote. What she seems to mean is that the judicious spectator
should not make decisions based upon lies or incomplete information. Empathy must
be felt for the situation in which another actually found herself (such as being bat-
tered by a spouse), not for a purely manufactured, fictional situation. Furthermore,
the judicious spectator must know the significance of the facts for the actors at the
time, not a pretended significance. For example, the spectator must ask whether the
victim feared her spouse would kill her, or whether that is a lie meant to cover up her
greed for his life insurance policy proceeds. Finally, because empathy must be tem-
pered by normative assessment, the judicious spectator must be ready to make
judgments about whether the facts or their significance were distorted in the actors'
own mind. For example, the spectator must judge whether the battered woman accu-
rately saw her husband pick up a baseball bat, or whether she was mistaken. See
NussmUM, supra note 158, at 74-75.
Nussbaum's reading of the judicious spectator does not, therefore, require re-
jecting a belief that realism makes sense for many fact determinations, that is, those
not involving mental states. Even for some aspects of mental-state determination,
Nussbaum apparently recognizes that our judgments can turn on ordinary assess-
ments of credibility rooted in realist notions, but this recognition is fully consistent
with the position argued here.
Assume, for example, that Lyle and Erik Menendez were simply lying in claim-
ing that they had been sexually abused as children and in further claiming that they
killed their parents because they feared that their parents would instead kill them. See
HAZEL THom-rroN, HUNG JuRr. THE Dr.aR¢ OF A MENENDEZ JUROR at xiv-xvii
(1995) (summarizing prosecution and defense versions of the facts in this infamous
case). Here, we can challenge in the usual fashion their credibility about whether
certain acts-past sexual abuse and currently physically threatening behavior by their
parents-took place. Thus, a dose family member in a position to testify about such
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"reflective assessment of the situation to figure out whether the par-
ticipants have understood it correctly and reacted reasonably ... .171
Moreover, the spectator must filter out emotions that derive from our
acts might declare that they never took place. If believed, then the Menendez' claims
of fear-mental-stare claims-become incredible.
There is a key distinction here. The Menendez brothers admit a criminal act
(illing) but argue for a less or nonculpable mental state based on alleged acts by oth-
ers (their parents). Disproving the parents' physical acts tends to rebut the suspects'
claimed mental state. Here, however, I have largely been addressing a different ques-
tion: "Supposing that the Menendez parents did engage in threatening acts of sexual
abuse, what were Lyle and Erils mental states, and were they reasonable?" This
question is an interpretive one that may be informed by an understanding of the dy-
namics of child sexual abuse.
The remaining problem is that a jury does not first decide the physical facts and
report them to the judge, with the judge then deciding whether to admit expert tes-
timony at some later stage. Rather, the jury hears all the evidence, then renders a
single verdict. Testimony by an expert on child sexual abuse that the Menendez
brothers' behavior was consistent with such abuse would tend to support both their
credibility and help directly to prove that acts of parental sexual abuse occurred. As I
have argued, the latter proof question-the occurrence of an act-should generally be
judged by more traditional evidentiary standards.
At the same time, however, the experts' testimony about the dynamics of child
sexual abuse and the Menendez brothers' role in those dynamics may be relevant to
the interpretive question of what was their mental state if, indeed, they were sexually
abused. This situation is thus very different from the battered woman case in which
the husband's abuse is undisputed and only the wife's mental state is at issue. There
may thus be cases where the line between proof of acts and proof of mental state
plain and simple is hard to draw. I have noted earlier that we should be wary of ad-
mitting expert testimony in such cases. Whether we can ever do so, and subject to
what safeguards, is a complex question that cannot filly be answered until reviewing
the plausibility/implausibility distinction to be developed in the companion piece,
For now, my primary goal is simply to emphasize that the judicious spectator concept
is consistent with the need to make credibility judgments and with the assumption
that sometimes realism makes sense; there is a "true view" of what is going on. But this
approach--drawing on aspects of modernism and aspects ofpostmodernism, with the
mix varying with the situation-is fully consistent with the pragmatic postmodernism
I articulated earlier in this piece.
Finally, my argument that determinations of mental state plain and simple are
interpretive acts, while other sorts of trial determinations are not, is more precisely a
relative, rather than an absolute, notion. "Did John hit Sally?" is either true or false in
a realist sense, but our interpretive assumptions-our prejudices, preconceptions, and
beliefi-may affect our ability accurately to answer that question. For such a ques-
tion, there is a single "objective" truth to discover, but it may be hard to do so. On
the other hand, as the Menendez problem illustrates, the answers to realist questions
are relevant even to the more "purely" interpretive (and thus nonrealist) determina-
tion of mental state.
171. NussBAum, supra note 158, at 74.
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interest in our personal well-being, "that portion of anger, fear, and so
on, that focuses on the self."" n
Smith's arguments concern our attitude for.making moral judg-
ments.' 73 But trials are necessarily morality plays, 74 and our moral
reasoning is necessarily narrative in form. 75
Professor Martha Nussbaum argues that the judicious spectator is
an extremely good model for the juror. 76 Of course, jurors will also be
constrained in legal ways regarding what they may consider. A jury
behaving like the judicious spectator will be simultaneously emotion-
ally empathic, detached, and judgmental: "Sympathetic emotion that
is tethered to the evidence, institutionally constrained in appropriate
ways, and free from reference to one's own situation ... [is] not only
acceptable but actually essential to public judgment."'1
There are also political implications in the stories told at trial. All
social storytelling involves power. 7 1 Whose stories are told, whose
heard, and whose believed simultaneously reflect and create power.17'
Stories create our sense of the real by including some voices while ex-
172. NUSSBAUM, supra note 158, at 74. Importantly, Nussbaum notes that Smith derives
the "judicious spectator" from literary readership, an approach to reading good sto-
ries. See NUSSEAum, supra note 158, at 10, 75. Nussbaum sees the judicious spectator
as linked to the uniqueness and value of every individual human being:
If we do not begin with "fancy" and wonder about the human shapes be-
fore us, with sympathy for their sufferings and joy at their well-being, if we
do not appreciate the importance of viewing each person as separate with a
single life to live, then our critique of pernicious emotions will have little
basis.
NUSSEAUM, supra note 158, at 76.
173. See SM-rH, supra note 168.
174. See Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Function of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197-98 (1983) (explaining
that the determination of mental state in a criminal trial necessarily involves moral
evaluation); Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 419-24 (stating that the
fact/value distinction is an illusion); see also Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 79
(explaining that much of the substantive criminal law embodies an evaluative con-
ception of emotions as part of mental states and requires jurors to judge the moral
appropriateness of a criminal defendant's emotions).
175. See Margaret Urban Walker, Picking Up Pieces: Lives, Stories, and Integrity, in Finmi-
Nis'rs RTmmrN HE SEI., supra note 28, at 62, 62-81.
176. See NussEAum, supra note 158, at 77-78.
177. NussBAUM, supra note 158, at 78.
178. See KEN PLUmmER, TEU.ING SExuA. STORES: POWER, CHANGE AND SocI.AL Woas
26-31 (1995).
179. See PLuMMER, supra note 178, at 26-31.
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cuding others. 8° Stories can thus empower and energize, or they can
degrade, control, dominate, and pathologize. 8' Jodi Armour put it
thus:
Storytelling-narrative-shapes our responses to the world.
It excites and channels our passions and sympathies, inviting
us to become certain kinds of people (compassionate and
understanding or self-righteous and vindictive, for example).
Narrative, moreover, can be subversive. What is taken for
granted in a dominant narrative-truth, common sense, rea-
sonableness-may be fiercely contested in the outsider
version. 1
The framing of narrative, therefore, carries profoundly political
implications. "Put differently, the terms of narrative are prizes in a
pitched conflict among groups to describe their social reality, consti-
tute their social identity, and vindicate their social existence." 3
The rules of evidence, because they control the terms under
which tales can be told, are thus necessarily political.' Each individ-
ual's trial is a battleground for group interests and perceptions, which
are inextricably bound up in the selves that constitute the parties, the
judge, and the jury and are reflected in the relationships among them
all. The battle is an epistemological one-whose worldview will con-
trol?85 When dominant worldviews prevail, dominant systems of
180. See CODE, RHETORiCAL SPACEs, supra note 40, at 154-84; Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories,
supra note 15 (illustrating this point in rape trials).
181. See PLunMMR, supra note 178, at 26-31.
182. ARMOUR, supra note 94, at 81.
183. ARMOUR, supra note 94, at 81.
184. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 514-16 (reluctantly conceding this "postmodern
insight-).
185. See ARMOUR, supra note 94, at 81-114. This battle of worldviews is an observation,
not a moral aspiration. Some feminists would decry the notion that politics necessar-
ily should involve a market-based conflict among narrowly self-interested groups. See,
e.g., Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Communiy,
in FEMrmISM & PoLnCAL. THEORY 143, 143-45 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990) Many
feminists reject an abstract political individualism in which self-interested utility
maximizers form communities based on competition and conflict among persons vy-
ing for scarce resources. An alternative feminist vision would favor an ideal in which
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power distribution are instantiated by the jury's very act of decision. 1 6
But those decisions also affect human and material resources: who gets
access to physical freedom, money, education, and who does not.
Power politics and epistemology merge.
For example, patriarchal cultural storytelling rules lead jurors in
rape trials to look for physical "bruises" as evidence of bullying."er Ab-
sent such bruises, the chances of conviction fall.188 Rape trauma
syndrome ("RTS") is one way to convince jurors that there are psychic
and behavioral bruises as real and objective as physical ones.' 9 Yet, in
many courts patriarchal evidence rules permit use of RTS to rebut
rape myths but not to prove that a rape (as opposed to consensual
sexual intercourse) occurred."9 This latter prohibition seems to ban
Armour notes that evidence rules that broaden context and perspective confront
jurors with the social, cultural, and economic conditions surrounding an incident. See
ARMouR, supra note 94, at 82-83. That confrontation reduces the perception of an
actor's unbridled free will, forcing jurors to confront the political assumptions and
effects of the criminal justice system. See AmouR, supra note 94, at 81-114. Paul
Harris sees this confrontation as a wise process that pushes jurors to see society as
sharing responsibility for the crime, without necessarily freeing defendants of respon-
sibility. See HAmIs, supra note 93, at 264-75. This widened perspective in turn helps
to promote a liberating social vision. See Hauus, supra note 93, at 264-75.
186. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 433-75 (illustrating this point in
rape trials).
187. Our culture teaches us, through stories, about proper gendered behavior and about
rape. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 434-39. Jurors bring those sto-
ries into the courtroom, where victims' accounts are judged by their consistency with
cultural tales embodying common themes. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note
15, at 434-39. One of those themes is that only bullies rape. See Taslitz, Patriarchal
Stories, supra note 15, at 448-53. But all men are expected to use some force without
thereby becoming bullies, so bullies are those who use much more significant force
against weaker opponents. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 448-53.
Juries will, therefore, look for signs of bullying, with physical bruises being among
the most common. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 448-53. Because
rape victims often do not suffer such bruises, their accounts fail to match the rules for
a "good" rape story. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 491-92. Ac-
counts that do not fit the rules of patriarchal cultural storytelling do not seem
credible. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 434-39.
188. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 448-53, 491-93.
189. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, 491-93.
190. See Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Fxpert Psychological
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. Ii. L. Ray. 691,725. For a thorough
recent survey of when and for what purposes courts admit RTS testimony, and for
alternative definitions of RTS, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL, MODERN SCIENIIC
EVIDENCE: THE JAW AND SCmNCE OF EXPERT TEsnoI Y §§ 10-1.1 to -1.5, at 402-
14 (1997) [hereinafter FMGmm, EXPERT TarsnoN1]. The fine points of RTS analy-
sis--such as whether there is a difference between disproving consent and proving a
rape, or between RTS's "consistency" with rape and its "proving" a rape-need not
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bruise-like reasoning; that is, the claim that just as a bruise demon-
strates that you were punched, rape trauma syndrome demonstrates
that you were raped.' Cultural stories require proof that expert evi-
dence rules bar. It is therefore hard to translate a rape victim's
experience into terms that jurors can understand. That means, in turn,
that the jurors' reality will diverge dramatically from the victim's.
There will be a failure of the detached empathy that judicious specta-
torship requires.
This does not necessarily mean that the ban on bruise-like rea-
soning is inappropriate. But both the overall evidence in a particular
case and any relevant scientific data might be subject to several plausi-
ble interpretations. 192 Each interpretation and each evidence rule will
have political implications, which will make the adoption of particular
interpretations more or less likely.'93 Since politics is unavoidable, we
should overtly consider the political impact of our evidence rules as
one relevant factor in crafting them. This consideration is particularly
weighty regarding mental-state determinations, precisely because those
judgments necessarily involve preexisting politically-charged interpre-
tive schema that may have repressive consequences. 94 Society should
concern us in any detail for the narrow points illustrated here. I do, however, note
that evidence that a woman was emotionally injured (even if not physically injured
beyond the act of intercourse) by a suspect is evidence that she did not consent. Con-
sent, in turn, is a mental state of the victim. So viewed, RTS goes to prove the
victim's mental state, not the defendant's wrongful act. On the other hand, if non-
consent is more likely, then any alleged physical acts by the defendant to overcome
nonconsent are more likely too. While I think that RTS legitimately goes far more
directly to proving the victim's mental state than to any act by the defendant, agree-
ing with that conclusion is not necessary to the point for which I cite the RTS-
bruising example in the text. My point is to illustrate that evidentiary rulings, such as
courts' treatment of RTS, have both political implications and implications for jurors'
ability to feel detached empathy for others. That illustration holds whether you be-
lieve that the dominant purpose of RTS concerns the victim's mental state or not.
191. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 491-93 & n.660.
192. See, e.g., KIRE, supra note 40, at 177-79 (conceding that scientific data may be sub-
ject to many interpretations, not all of which are equal); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra
note 23, at 96-98 (encouraging the jury to consider "plausible alternatives to normal"
in evaluating the total impact of case evidence as a legitimate evidentiary goal).
193. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113 (illustrating the political values un-
derlying the Supreme Court's interpretation of evidence rules); Taslitz, MyselfAone,
supra note 23, at 19-24, 86-91 (illustrating the political values underlying expert
character evidence decisions).
194. See, e.g., ARmouR, supra note 94, at 81-114. Armour stresses in particular that
seemingly neutral evidence rules can benefit the majority. He quotes this example
from Mark Kelman to darify how this pro-majority bias affects rule definition:
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strive toward a citizenry willing to craft more liberating interpreta-
tions-ones more respectful of the equal dignity of all persons-from
among the plausible options."'
For these same reasons, we should not automatically impose the
burden on ihe party seeking to change the status quo. No set of social
relations, including rules of law, is purely "natural"; an element of
social choice is always involved.'96 Thus, jurors come to a rape trial
with preconceptions about appropriate gendered behavior and the
nature of rape. These preconceptions need not be "myths." Instead,
the preconceptions might sometimes accurately reflect, indeed help to
constitute, the relationships between the sexes in a patriarchal soci-
ety.197 Yet, we might normatively deem those conceptions wrong and
certainly not reflective of all social actors. If that is so, why should we
automatically impose the burden on the prosecution to show that ex-
pert testimony seeking to substitute a different, nonpatriarchal vision
of sexual relationships merits admission at trial?
One response might be that this opens the door to simple propa-
ganda, unsupported by any serious scientific inquiry and thus not
offering any special "expertise" that a layperson does not offer. But
this still does not answer the burdens question. We might simply say
that the defense has the burden of showing that the new prosecution
expert is simply a propagandist. Alternatively, we might take a middle
ground that concedes that the prosecution should bear the burden,
but lightens that burden relative to what it is in some other situa-
tions."'8 The point is that who has what kind of burden as to any
expert evidence question is both a contextual and political judgment.
A large social group is setting up a massive health insurance, risk-pooling
plan. Should treating hemophilia be included? Since hemophilia is a purely
hereditary ailment, everyone will know whether he faces high bills for the
disease. Purely selfish insurance purchasers will exclude the disease from
coverage. If the defense of duress is "insurance" against being blamed or in-
carcerated, the dominant social group will exclude "long-term pressures" as
a covered syndrome since they already know they will not be afflicted.
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Consruction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L
Rzv. 591, 646 n.144 (1981).
195. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 491-500; see also infra Part V.
196. Cf CAss SuNsiN, THE PrATLA. CONSTITTON (1993) (making this point in con-
nection with constitutional interpretation).
197. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 402-33.
198. See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 117-20 (explaining that political reasons
justify imposing a heavier burden on the prosecution than on the defense to prove
that psychological character evidence is reliable).
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Battered Woman's Syndrome (BWS or the syndrome) offers a
brief example. Weaknesses in the methodology by which the
syndrome was first articulated make it at least debatable whether the
syndrome itself, and certainly certain aspects of it such as "learned
helplessness" and the "cycle theory of violence",199 are plausible.200
Nevertheless, even the most vocal critics of the syndrome concede that
it helped to advance certain political goals, including increasing the
resources devoted to solving the problem of domestic violence,
focusing attention on the male-centered nature of the law of self-
defense, and promoting further research.20' Others recognize that,
despite the flawed methodology, the syndrome serves the
political/epistemic goal of effectively educating jurors about the nature
of domestic violence in a way that aids informed decision-making.0 2
Courts and legislators thus implicitly came down on the plausible side
of the debate, finding the syndrome plausible enough given its
political foundations. 3
But those foundations are crumbling. Syndrome logic has been
criticized for wrongly pathologizing women, for harming the many
who do not fit the "syndrome" but have been abused, and for failing
to treat women as capable of the kind of moral responsibility essential
to equal citizenship in a democratic polity.2 4 Furthermore, competing
empirical models, often based on sounder traditional scientific
199. "Learned helplessness" is the idea that battered women do not leave their batterers
because, like dogs electrically shocked upon trying to leave a cage, women learn that
they are helpless to stop the pain. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 81-82. The "cycle
theory of violence" argues that three phases characterize the battering relationship-
tension buildup, acute battering, and loving contrition. See DowNs, supra note 67, at
81-82. The cycle theory seeks to explain why it is reasonable for women both to feel
danger outside imminent harm and to stay despite that danger.
200. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 145-69 (cataloguing methodological flaws in BWS
research).
201. See Faigman, Age of Science, supra note 13, at 69 (also urging that we not politicize
science). I argue not for the politicization of science, but for the recognition of the
unavoidable politicization of evidence law more generally.
202. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 103-29 (praising BWS for dispelling myths and dis-
placing sexist cultural narratives).
203. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 485-91, 509-16 (claiming that BWS' admissibility
is only explainable on political grounds); Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note
141, at 795-96 (stating that all 50 states allowed some form of BWS testimony).
While Professor Mosteller noted the political component explaining BWS' admissi-
bility, I stress the political component in the challenges to BWS.
204. See DOWNS, supra note 67, at 158-220; Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note
141, at 800-01.
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methods, have come to the fore. 5 While no one model is dominant,
all the models, including aspects of BWS, can be seen as converging
on a picture of battered women as hyper-rational, rather than
pathological. Battered women are thus actors who, because of their
unusual life experiences, have an acute awareness of danger from the
batterer that those unfamiliar with the dynamics of battering would
not fully appreciate.2 6 Furthermore, the various models help to
convey the rational emotions involved by presenting powerful
evidence of the dangers, fears, and difficult choices these women had
to make.2° The growing consensus, therefore, is that contextual expert
205. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 76-99 (surveying alternative models); Faigman, Age of
Science, supra note 13, at 75 ("[A]lthough significant amounts of excellent research
have been done in the last decade, none of it has obtained results that support the
hypothesis of the battered woman syndrome."); Raeder, Doubk-Edged Sword, supra
note 141, at 798 ("Although there is general agreement that learned helplessness has
its limitations, no one concept has emerged as its replacement.").
206. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 96-99. Well-known researchers in this area express it
this way.
Considerable research also documents the wide range of responses taken by
battered women in violent relationships. Moreover, given the reality and
inherent danger that some of these actions may provoke, these behaviors
have been viewed more as a response to a realistic appraisal of the situation
as opposed to a helpless reaction to the violence.
FAimGAN, EXPERT TEsnrMorrv, supra note 190, § 8-2.3, at 377.
207. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 103-10. Awareness of the dangers, fears, and difficult
choices the woman had to make may go to the "reasonableness" of her actions in self-
defense. "Reasonableness" logically may include "normalcy," defined as behavior
typical of many people. But "reasonableness" ultimately involves an essentially moral
judgment that the woman's beliefs or actions were understandable. Professor
Mosteller suggests that expert testimony offered to show normalcy need not meet the
highest standards of Poppetian science, but testimony to show the understandable
nature of the woman's beliefs and actions should (absent strong countervailing rea-
sons) ordinarily be held to a stricter standard. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 480-
84, 502-03. I agree regarding the first use (normalcy), but not necessarily regarding
the second. To prove that a woman engaged in certain mental processes that explain
why she did not leave her barterer is still to prove mental state. Once proven, that
mental state is argued to be circumstantial evidence of the "reasonableness" of her act
of assault, given the social setting and other circumstances. Admittedly, this is a more
demanding task, requiring greater assurances of reliability, than in proving
"normalcy." But as discussed earlier, mental state is an interpretive act, and the qual-
ity of expert testimony regarding interpretation is to be judged by a different standard
(I leave to the companion piece whether that standard is "stricter" or not) than in
proving a physical fact about the world. Therefore, BWS should be judged, at most,
entirely by Popperian science only if offered to prove a physical act or its absence.
Such science should, however, be viewed more charitably and supplemented by other
kinds of science when proving mental state. Of course, experts should not be allowed
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testimony regarding battering relationships that avoids any rigid "one
size fits all" model and syndrome logic should be admissible.0
Juries are unlikely, however, to give such evidence proper weight
unless it is linked by clinical testimony to the specific defendant in-
volved.2° Moreover, such testimony may be essential to achieving the
detached empathy of the judicious spectator, precisely because it
brings together the unique defendant's life history in story-like fash-
ion. Many well-respected commentators continue to find sufficient
plausibility in BWS, however, to permit its continued use where it fits
the lived experience of a particular relationship or involves true pa-
thology, as with an insanity defense. 20 The point is that the growing
movement against BWS is largely and properly rooted in a political
critique that affects what we consider plausible and what weight we
assign to it.
211
The criticism does not hold that these political judgments to ad-
mit BWS or not are veiled changes in the substantive criminal law best
made by legislatures .2 " The judgment remains that each case of bat-
tering is in some sense unique and that juries are the appropriate
entities to make the contextual, case-by-case epistemic/moral judg-
ment of culpability. 2 3 The political decision, therefore, is simply that
juries need to be fully informed of the social and psychological con-
text to render better decisions.2"
expressly to opine about normalcy or reasonableness. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at
502-03.
208. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 67, at 227-28 (favoring contextual expert testimony that
avoids syndrome logic); Raeder, Double-Edged Sword supra note 141, at 795-802
(stating BWS is flawed in making one size fit all).
209. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 477 n.49.
210. See, e.g., DowNs, supra note 67, at 180 (discussing insanity or other pathology, but
preferring to focus on the woman's situation, rather than on her mental condition);
Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note 141, at 797 (suggesting that the application
of BWS be grounded in examination of the particular relationship).
211. See DowNs, supra note 67, at 27 ("Changes in the law of evidence reflect the socio-
logical and political condition of knowledge in addition to knowledge's purely
scientific status.").
212. See Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 115.
213. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 488 n.91 (recognizing that the focus on context is a
hallmark of feminism).
214. SeeMosteller, supra note 124, at 487, 515 n.181.
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III. THE FEMINIST JURY
Should feminists endorse this faith in the jury? The answer is yes.
A pragmatic, postmodern feminism, by viewing the self as relational,
recognizes the importance of community participation in the creation
of social meaning.1 Jury determinations also permit the kinds of
216
contextual, individualized judgments of which feminism approves. 1
Recognizing the invalidity of the fact/value distinction further sup-
ports a role for a properly educated, communal, moral voice in fact-
finding.1 7 Martha Nussbaum, indeed, seemed attracted to the
"judicious spectator" model for jury decision-making precisely because
of her very feminist belief that unbiased, empathic, individualized
justice is an important good often best achieved by juries.2 ' Indeed,
215. See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 Cu. L Ray. 1339,
1342-43 (1987) (advocating an implicitly feminist approach to hearsay by defending
juries' contextual reasoning as the appropriate voice of the community); supra text ac-
companying notes 143-190. I spend some time articulating a feminist vision of the
jury for several reasons. First, feminists provide additional reasons to those offered by
some other theorists for trust in the institution of the jury. At the same time, femi-
nists are alert to the dangers of juries being abused in ways that oppress women and
others. If feminists express support for the jury, despite these dangers, that is persua-
sive evidence of at least a perceived liberating potential in jury decision-making. Yet
feminists' cautions also teach us not to trust the jury blindly, but rather to consider
ways to improve its finctioning. Essentially, feminist theory suggests rejecting a
reading of Daubert that favors "screening" weak evidence from the jury and accepting
instead a reading that mandates proper jury education. Solutions other than exclusion
of expert testimony should be considered first, turning to exclusion only if other
methods fail. See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 113-20 (discussing evidence
law alternatives to simple exclusion of evidence).
Second, while there might be nonfeminist reasons for trusting the jury, I would
be wary of such trust ifI thought it undermined broader, liberating feminist goals. It
is important to demonstrate that trusting in a particular conception of the jury is con-
sistent with feminist theory. The companion piece will address in more detail how
expert evidence law can further serve this particular feminist conception.
I therefore offer just enough review of feminist theory to support these two
points, but I do not present a comprehensive pragmatic postmodern theory of the
jury, an effort that would require book-length treatment and that is, in any event, not
necessary to my task here.
216. Compare Swift, supra note 215, at 1342-43, with Orenstein, My God, supra note 15,
at 183-95.
217. See Taslitz, PatriarchalStories, upra note 15, at 419-24.
218. See NussBuM, supra note 158, at 73-78:
Among [the judicious spectator's] most important moral faculties is the
power of imagining vividly what it is like to be each of the persons whose
situation he imagines.
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many feminist legal reforms to the criminal justice system-rape
shield laws, battered women experts, rape trauma experts-focus on
improving the empathic, contextualized decision making of jurors via
evidentiary reform, rather than broadly applicable changes in substan-
tive rules of criminal law.219
Part III defends the claim that feminist evidence rules should
reflect trust in the institution of the jury in greater detail. Part III also
defends a particular conception of the jury as an empathic,
communal, deliberative body, rather than an emotionally detached
collection of self-interested individuals whose biases are played against
one another. The deliberative, communal function of the jury makes
it an inherently political institution. Once the empathic nature of the
jury is recognized, policymakers and trial judges may more clearly
understand the relevance and weight of certain expert testimony in a
way they otherwise would not, as Part IV will illustrate. Once the
political nature of the jury is appreciated, policymakers and trial
judges should also better understand the need for candor about the
role of evidentiary politics in expert evidence decisions, as Part V will
explore. Finally, viewing the trial as a way to educate the jury as
community representative cautions against too easily excluding expert
The judicious spectator/reader learns an emotional repertory that is rich
and intense but flee from the special bias that derives from knowing one's
own personal stake in the outcome. A reader's emotions will also be con-
strained by the "record"-by the fact that they are restricted to the
information presented in the text. In this way, we can now see, the judi-
cious spectator is an extremely good model for the juror.
[The judicious spectator learns] what it is to have emotion, not for a
"Faeless undifferentiated mass," but for the "uniquely individual human
being."
219. See, e.g., PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WomAN ScomRNan 161-83 (1996) (explaining the
historical growth of rape shield and other rape law reforms from feminist political
theory); CASSIA SpoHN & JuIsm HoRNuY, RAPE LAw REFoUa 25-29 (1992)
(explaining the role of rape shield laws in counteracting rape myths that may skew
understanding of a rape victim's situation); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Femi-
nist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials 45-63 (draft manuscript 1997, on
file with the Michigan Journal of Gender and Law) [hereinafter Orenstein, No Bad
Men.] (supporting an expanded role for experts in rape and battering trials); Taslitz,
Myself Alone, supra note 23 (exploring ways that psychological experts can improve
jurors' contextualized decision-making); Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at
389-94, 491-500 (framing a discussion exploring how to promote more informed
verdicts in rape cases).
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testimony, rather than re-crafting it to improve its value for the fact-
finder.
A Difference and Empathy Critics
Martha Minow's analysis of how two streams of feminist
thought--"difference critics" and "empathy critics"-view peremp-
tory challenges sheds light on the feminist jury ideal.20 Difference
critics reject universal norms because they mask the subordinate
groups' perspectives."' Different group life experiences and con-
sciousness lead, on average, to different group perspectives. m To
judge anyone, particularly someone from a disempowered group,
without them being represented on the jury is to exclude a perspective
necessary for a complete picture and an informed judgment. Moreo-
ver, there is a value in group participation itself as an exercise of
power, bringing the group involved more fully into the broader com-
munity. While not every group member will fairly represent the
group, the group is more willing to trust its own members as repre-
sentatives than nonmembers.'
Empathy critics, by contrast, trust that we can sometimes effec-
tively and fairly speak for and understand those different from
ourselves.? We can do so because of the power of altruism:
[Mlaybe, just maybe, the idea that we are all basically self-
interested is wrong .... Some feminists, some humanists,
some self-styled communitarians join a variety of people who
think it wrong or incomplete to think of people as separate,
autonomous, and self-interested. I will call these people the
empathy advocates. They argue that people (1) often want to
care about the good of others (altruism) and (2) have the
ability to understand and know the wants and needs of oth-
ers (empathy). The empathy advocates also argue that
individuals act out of duty, love, and benevolence as well as
220. Martha Minow, From Class Actions to "Mis Saigonl- The Concept of Representation in
the Law, in REPrESENnTNG WoMm: Ltw, LmrATuRE, D FEMINISM 8, 17-20
(Susan Sage Heinzelman & Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman eds., 1994).
221. See Minow, supra note 220, at 17-18.
222. See Minow, supra note 220, at 17-18.
223. See Minow, supra note 220, at 17-20 (describing difference critic views).
224. See Minow, supra note 220, at 19.
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self-interest ... and the common good when they decide
what constitutes a "benefit" that they want to maximize.21'
Moreover, empathy critics "explain the malleability of human beings,
and discuss how learning environments and social arrangements can
reinforce either selfishness or sharing and altruism."
226
These differing views might suggest differing answers to the
question of whether, or when, to permit peremptory challenges. But
Minow argues the opposite, relying on Hernandez v. New York,227 in
which a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court approved the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all Spanish-speaking
jurors. The prosecutor argued that such jurors would not limit them-
selves to the official translation and would have undue jury room
influence."'
Difference critics responded that excluding Spanish-speaking ju-
rors from a trial involving Spanish speakers excluded a critical
perspective.229 Someone lacking that perspective, especially if a mem-
ber of the dominant social group, "may lack awareness of the
perceptions and motivations of someone outside that group, and may
even lack the tools to understand someone so different." 20 In any
event, Spanish speakers must be allowed to participate in broader
communal decisions."2
Empathy critics reached the same conclusion. The problem for
these critics is that excluding Spanish speakers assumes that people
cannot empathize across group lines. Spanish speakers can come to
understand non-Spanish speakers and vice versa. Moreover, Spanish-
speaking jurors can be fair and will not necessarily act in the self-
interest of their group.2 2
While we may not know whether empathy works differently be-
tween those sharing certain traits and those not, that ignorance simply
suggests the wisdom of a diverse range of views so that "the full range
225. Minow, supra note 220, at 19.
226. Minow, supra note 220, at 19.
227. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (Kennedy, J., plurality).
228. See Hernandez 500 U.S. at 353.
229. See Minow, supra note 220, at 21-22 & 39 nn.94-95.
230. Minow, supra note 220, at 22.
231. See Minow, supra note 220, at 22.
232. See Minow, supra note 220, at 22.
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of empathic and nonempathic possibilities [can] be played out." 33 Ex-
cluding Spanish speakers was wrong.
B. The Deliberative Jury
Despite the convergence of difference and empathy theorists in
Minow's example, she apparently finds a fundamental contradiction
between the two theories' notions of juries' nature.23 While empathy
theorists stress community, difference theorists stress group conflict.
That stress may be seen as adopting the Hobbesian notion that
"humans are separate and have conflicting wills." ' Juries are not
communities but an occasion for interest group politics.
Yet this contradiction can be resolved because difference critics'
views are consistent with the "deliberative jury ideal." This ideal is "a
model of democracy that believes that face-to-face meetings matter,
that voting is secondary to debate and discussion, that power should
ultimately go to the persuasive, [and] that collective wisdom results
from gathering people in conversation from different walks of life. 
"
1
6
Ballard v. United States 7 illustrates this point. In this case, Edna
Ballard and her son were convicted of mail fraud for seeking to make
profit from promoting a religion in which they themselves allegedly
did not believe. The trial court had excluded all women from the jury
on the grounds that the courthouse lacked adequate accommodations
for women. The Court, exercising its supervisory power, reversed the
conviction, declaring that deliberate exclusion of women from jury
service in a jurisdiction in which they were eligible to serve violated
the jury's obligation to reflect a cross-section of the community.
While the Court conceded that neither women nor men necessarily
act as a class, the Court concluded that women could offer a perspec-
tive that men could not:
233. Minow, supra note 220, at 23.
234. See Minow, supra note 220, at 19-20.
235. Minow, supra note 220, at 19.
236. JEFFREy AERAmSON, WE TH Juty 245 (1994). Although Abramson does not ex-
pressly identify himself as a feminist, his views on the jury are strikingly consistent
with Nussbaum's "Judicious spectator" and Minow's discussion of "empathy critics."
I cite him here because he demonstrates that difference and more overtly communal
views are not necessarily in conflict.
237. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946). See also ABRwsoN, supra note
236, at 118-22 (offering a similar analysis of Ballard and expressly identifying Bal-
lard as embodying a "difference" perspective).
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[I]f the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a
jury was truly representative of the community if all men
were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a
community made up exclusively of one is different from a
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influ-
ence one on the other is among the imponderables. To
insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case
make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is
lost if either sex is excluded.2S
This quotation is a classic statement of a difference perspective:
women change the nature of the community because they offer a dis-
tinct quality. Yet the focus is not on votes or outcomes. Rather, the
focus is on deliberations, the "subtle interplay" of influence, the
"flavor" of the debate. Indeed, the Court went on to explain how
women would change that flavor. The Court noted that because most
children "receive the first and most lasting teaching of religious truths
from their mothers,"" 9 women might see Mrs. Ballard's fundraising
activities with her son in a very different light than would men.
The Ballard Courts fusion of the difference perspective with the delib-
erative ideal has not always prevailed. There are more recent cases where the
Court indeed viewed the jury as a forum for interest group politics.240
238. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94.
239. Ballarda 329 U.S. at 194.
240. The most significant such case is Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In this
case, Taylor appealed his aggravated kidnapping conviction to the Supreme Court on
the ground that he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by a representative
segment of the community given the systematic underrepresentation of women on
the jury list. The Court agreed, concluding that a nonrepresentative jury could not be
an impartial jury. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. But an "impartial" jury reflects the
"diversely biased people" of our community. See ABRAMsoN, supra note 236, at 122.
Professor Abramson summarized the Court's reasoning thus:
In other words, impartiality was accomplished by turning the traditional
search for disinterested jurors on its head: we should realistically admit that
jury deliberation is but the interplay of group biases. Paradoxical as it
sounds, the Taylor court was committed to the notion that the most im-
partial jury was the jury that most accurately reflected the mix of popular
prejudices.
ABiAmAsoN, supra note 236, at 122. Thereafter, Abramson surveys other decisions
showing a deep confusion in the courts over whether the difference or deliberative
ideal should prevail. See ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 122-41. The most recent ex-
ample of this confusion at the Supreme Court is J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127
(1994). J.E.B. held that intentional discrimination by state actors on the basis of gen-
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Moreover, some well-publicized cases in which juries voted or split along
racial or gender lines seem to call the deliberative ideal into question.24'
der in exercising peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See .EB., 511 U.S. at 130-31.
The majority at first seemed to support the deliberative ideal, quoting Ballard favora-
bly and at length. SeeJ.EB., 511 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, the Court suggested
sensitivity to the need for many voices in deliberation by stressing its appreciation
"for the value of women's contribution to civic life." J.EB., 511 U.S. at 134. That
need was reinforced by the Court's historical survey of the exclusion of women from
juries. SeeJ.EB., 511 U.S. at 131-36. But, rather than expressly relying solely on the
argument that women's voices are needed to promote a deliberative exchange of
many views, the Court stressed the perceived absence of evidence of any significant
differences in jurors' views due to their gender. SeeJ.EB., 511 U.S. at 137-38 n.9.
The idea of such differences was bemoaned as stereotyping. SeeJ.EB., 511 U.S. at
138. Jurors should be excluded based on discoveries of "actual or implied bias," but
such bias should not automatically be assumed based on gender. J.EB., 511 U.S. at
143. This emphasis on bias arguably sounds more like a group-conflict conception of
the jury.
Ultimately, the apparently conflicting language in the opinion can be resolved.
Even the Ballard Court, in adopting the deliberative ideal, acknowledged that neither
women nor men necessarily act as a class. See Balard 329 U.S. at 193. It would be
wrong, therefore, to exclude individuals based on a presumed gendered group bias. It
would certainly be wrong to assume that a potential juror is more likely to vote for a
particular outcome based on his or her gender. But these observations are perfectly
consistent with believing that a group on average brings new insights, which creates a
more informed deliberation. Permitting the exclusion of an entire group (women) by
peremptories would deprive the jury of those insights.
Other concerns beyond the group-conflict versus deliberative ideals played large
roles in the Court's reasoning as well. In particular, the Court worried about
"extemalities"--costs imposed by courtroom participants on those not involved in
the trial. See TAsLriz, CuLTm OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 15 (defining exter-
nalities). Thus, the Court feared that stereotypical abuse of peremptories would
"ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women."
J.EB., 511 U.S. at 140. The message sent within and beyond the courtroom would
be one of female inferiority. SeeJ.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142.
Most of the concurring and dissenting opinions seemed, however, to favor a
group-conflict theory. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressed a belief in
gender-linked, result-oriented biases and viewed peremptories as a way of eliminating
extremes of partiality. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy's, concurrence stressed that the idea of a jury representative of the
community is merely "a structural mechanism for preventing bias." J.EB., 511 U.S.
at 154 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's dissent, also stressed gendered
biases, seeJ.EB., 511 U.S. at 154-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),- and Justice Scalia's
dissent, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, stressed gendered bias, group-
based conflict, and partiality as central to jury functioning. See J.EB., 511 U.S. at
156-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. For example, the officers who beat Rodney King were acquitted in their first trial by a
largely white jury, and the original Erik Menendez jury hung along gender lines. See
ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 103-04.
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Nevertheless, diverse juries rarely deadlock, and while demographic
factors affect jury decisions, the empirical studies do not "show that
jurors are so captivated by narrow group loyalties that they typically
vote in blocs." 2 2 To the contrary, "when jurors of different ethnic
groups deliberate together, they are better able to overcome their indi-
vidual biases." 24 The deliberative ideal holds.
Feminist critics thus view the jury as an opportunity for inter-
group conversation creating a broader, communal whole. Further-
more, feminists trust the competence of suitably diverse juries to
handle data.2" Indeed, part of the justification for diversity is that it
brings new information and perspectives to bear, thereby improving
the quality of debate and the accuracy of decisions. Feminists thus
articulate both political and epistemological reasons for trusting the
jury.2 45 A feminist approach to evidence law thus asks how we can
"improve the quality and quantity of evidence, raise empathy, and
promote reasoned deliberations," rather than how we can "protect
ourselves from jury ignorance and confusion."24'
C. A Jury ofHer Peers
The feminist novella, A Jury of Her Peers,24 in part raises the
question of what to do when feminist jury ideals fail, while at the
242. ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 104.
243. Stanley M. Weisberg, Out of the Frying Pan or into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue
After Rodney IGng, 106 HAm. L Rnv. 705, 709 (1993); see also ABRAMsoN, supra
note 236, at 104 (evaluating the empirical data).
244. See GODFREY D. LEHMAN, WE THE JURY: THE IMPAct OF JURORS ON OuR BAsic
FREEDOMS 18, 24-25 (1997).
245. See Minow, supra note 220, at 20-23.
246. The feminist version of the core question of evidence law articulated here follows
from Nussbaum, Minow, and Abramson's emphases on empathy, an informed judi-
cious spectator, and a diverse, deliberative jury. See supra notes 220-45 and
accompanying text. The "jury ignorance and confusion" alternative follows from the
deep distrust of the jury expressed in Popperian readings of Daubert. See supra notes
11-13 and accompanying text. For a compelling recent argument that the framers
had a communal conception of the jury as a "breeding ground for good citizenship,"
a check on governmental power, and a source of particularized justice (a vision similar
to but not identical with the feminist empathic vision), see AHiL REED A2aR &
AiAN Hwn c, FOR TxHE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONsTTUTnoN RALY SAYs ABOUT
YouR RIGHTs 54, 66, 110 (1998).
247. Susan Glaspell, AJury ofHer Peers, in LAw rN LrrBrR u: Lac.L TmwMs IN SHORT
STovals 124 (E. Gemmette ed., 1992). The summary of the plot here closely tracks
that in WEsT, supra note 28, at 242-58.
[Vol. 5:1
1998] A FEMINIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55
same time further elucidates those ideals. This novella involves the
investigation of a farmer's murder. The farmer was strangled to death
by a rope. His wife is the chief suspect. The story opens with the
murder being investigated in the farmer's home by the sheriff, a
neighbor, and a prosecutor. These three men have brought two
women with them: the sheriff's and the neighbor's wives. The two
women chat in the kitchen while their husbands search the house
looking for evidence of a motive. The men ignore the kitchen, con-
centrating their search on what they see as more likely places, such as
the bedrooms and the barn. The women end up finding evidence in
the kitchen.
[Their] attention is drawn to domestic items, such as sewing;
they quickly notice that the woman's usually careful stitching
went terribly awry at one point, as if she had suffered some
shock. Eventually, their affinity with a homemaker's world
leads them to a sewing box, in which they find a dead ca-
nary, its neck broken in quite the same way as the
husband's.48
To the women, the evidence reveals a severely disturbed and abusive
marital relationship. The women view this evidence, however, as ex-
culpatory, not inculpatory. In the women's view, the murder was
justified or excused. This metaphorical jury of the wife's peers acquits
her, hiding the evidence to ensure against a less well-informed body
missing the truth.249
The women's extraordinary sense of empathy for another and
their ability to craft a persuasive tale from an understanding of male-
female relationships and everyday particularities are reminiscent of
Nussbaum's judicious spectator.25 The unique knowledge and
sensibilities that lead the women to find evidence that the men
overlook seems to embody difference-theorist insights. The women's
wide-ranging conversation and exchange of ideas additionally reflect
the deliberative ideal. Furthermore, it is the women's free access to
information and ability to understand its meaning and probative value
that enables them to solve the crime.
248. ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 120 n.*.
249. See ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 120 n.* (offering a similar reading of the story);
WhsT, supra note 28, at 243 (same).
250. Seesupra text accompanying notes 158-77.
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But the women do not wholly embrace the empathy critics' per-
spective. They have doubts about the ability of the dominant group,
men, to understand the situation if fully informed, so the women hide
the evidence. Only peers (in-group members) can do justice.2 5'
That caution indeed has animated some feminist evidentiary re-
forms. 252 And the concerns the novella raises-that "outsiders" may
sometimes have trouble understanding another's pain-must continue
to be borne in mind. But feminism, because it envisions the possibil-
ity of change, is fundamentally optimistic. 53 Feminism is also realistic.
it recognizes that men will likely dominate all institutions of justice,
from the legislature to the bureaucracy and the judiciary.25 Accord-
251. See ABRAMSON, supra note 236, at 120 n.*.
252. Rape shield laws, which keep a woman's sexual history from the jury, for example,
can be seen as an effort to reduce the chances that men and ideologically-blinded
women will judge rape victims with the cognitive blinders of patriarchy. See Taslitz,
Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 389-94, 404-33.
253. See, e.g., FLORA DAVIS, MOVING nm MouNrAnI: THE WOEN'S MOVEMaENTr IN
AMERIcA SINcE 1960, at 493 (1991) ("[Gliven the enormous resistance to change
over the past thirty years and what feminisis have been able to accomplish in spite of
it, prospects are good. As long as there's a strong women's movement, further prog-
ress is inevitable.").
254. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy, Introduction, in FEMINIST
L cAL Ts-aoa READINGS IN LAw AND GENDER 1-11 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Ro-
sanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (discussing a variety of approaches of different
"feminisms"). Of course, men might seek to dominate the institution of the jury too.
Cf TAsurrz, CULT E oF aE COURTROOM, supra note 15 (discussing the on-average
differences in male/female speaking styles that sometimes enable men to dominate
women in public discussions). Rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which
geierally prohibit inquiries into what happened in the jury room, will make such ef-
forts at dominance hard to ascertain. Nevertheless, a diverse jury is a relatively less
hierarchical, more communal institution than the alternative-decision by a judge.
The jury, unlike the judge, consists of laypersons, not legal experts who purport to
hold an arcane knowledge unavailable to ordinary folk. Moreover, precisely because
they are not legal specialists, these laypersons will not have developed the cynicism or
tendency toward easy professional categorization ("Oh, not another gunpoint robbery
by an 'innocent' man!") that judges may have developed, and thus will be more capa-
ble of empathy and individualized justice. Cf RzicHaRw LEmPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS,
AN INvrrATION TO LAw AND SocIAL ScIENcE: DESERT, DIsPrUTEs, AND DISTRIBU-
TION 75-78 (1986); Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 89. Furthermore, diverse
viewpoints, including those of women, at least have a chance of being heard in a de-
bate among community representatives, unlike the univocality of the single, distant
guardian of the law, the trial judge. Additionally, communal, cooperative decision-
making is highly valued by many feminist theorists who seek to honor on-average fe-
male/male differences in decision-making styles, differences that are arguably due to
differing life experiences and circumstances. See TAsLIrz, CULTURE oF Ta COURT-
ROOM, supra note 15. Finally, efforts might be made in jury selection and in jury
instructions to create juries where male dominance is less likely. See infra text accom-
(Vol. 5:1
1998 A FEMINIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 57
ingly, voir dire must be used aggressively to weed out juror prejudice,
peremptories must be challenged where misused, and experts, who can
reduce unwise roadblocks to empathetic detachment, must be
sought.255 The gradual acceptance of BWS can thus be viewed as an
effort to promote this last goal-unbiased juror empathy. BWS' pos-
sible fall can be attributed to the same source, a growing consensus
that changes in our knowledge about battering and our understanding
of sociopolitical reality require new ways to achieve jury empathy. But
let there be no misunderstanding: creating unbiased, informed, con-
textual, communal judgment-faith in the feminist jury-remains the
goal.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
The BWS debate helps us to understand better the implications
of narrative theory and the deliberative-jury ideal for a feminist evi-
dence law. Expert testimony on general social and psychological
processes can serve to further the jury's "fancy," bringing their inter-
pretive scheme closer to the criminal defendant's or victim's. That
goal is aided by jurors' learning about group identities and common
group experiences. 256 But that goal can rarely be adequately achieved
without case-specific expert testimony about this person's life history
and motvaons.2 7 One sort of case-specific, expert testimony, the
panying note 255. Further elaboration of this last point is beyond the scope of this
Article, but would likely track reforms that I have elsewhere suggested would be wise
in rape trials, such as permitting an expanded voir dire focusing on certain personality
traits or beliefs considered undesirable in fair jurors. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories,
supra note 15, at 496-500.
255. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 497-500 (suggesting use of these
techniques in rape cases).
256. See, e.g., Orenstein, No Bad Men!, supra note 219, at 49-63 (advocating expanded
expert testimony on the common experiences and reactions of rape victims and rape
dynamics); Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note 141, at 790, 816 (advocating ex-
panded expert background testimony about the experiences of battered women and
the dynamics of battering relationships); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 23, at 25-
29 (explaining the value of group character evidence).
257. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 23, at 14-29, 76-81, 91-100. My purpose in
this Part is not to add yet another voice to the BWS debate. Indeed, I will rarely
mention the BWS in this Part. Rather, my goal is to recount broader lessons for all
social scientific evidence regarding mental state that can be gleaned from the BWS
debates recounted supra Part II.B. More specifically, the continued support for BWS
among many courts, legislators, and commentators, despite the weaknesses in the
supporting Popperian social science and the partial reliance on clinical rather than
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clinical psychologist's expert opinion, seeks to classify a person as fit-
ting within a certain category-for example, those displaying the
behaviors comprising BWS-and to articulate more individualized
explanations of someone's character, thoughts, and feelings.
2 58
I have elsewhere defended the occasional use of clinical testi-
mony, subject to fairly rigid safeguards, which include (1) relying on
multiple sources of data, not simply a single client interview; (2) the
maintenance of careful database records; (3) a careful, case-specific
examination of the plausibility of the hypothesis involved; (4) a review
of any available supporting empirical data for its strengths and weak-
nesses; (5) a critical examination of clinical hypotheses by others in a
properly trained clinical forensic team; (6) fully and fairly educating
the jury about the testimony's value; (7) cautiously limiting opinions
to probabilities and tendencies, not certainties; and (8) a demon-
strated awareness by clinicians of how their own cognitive biases can
affect their judgment.25 I will not repeat those arguments here but
offer several observations.
only experimental opinion, raises questions about whether BWS can be of any value
and, if not, whether alternative types of social science evidence on battering would be
preferable. This Part argues that clinical testimony and non-Popperian social science
can serve useful goals-acute observation, evidentiary richness, overcoming cognitive
blinders, and identifring plausible alternative interpretations of human text. Poppe-
rian social science can serve these goals as well and has shed light on arguably sounder
interpretations of battering. See supra Part II. The point, however, is that the Poppe-
rian flaws in BWS research should not automatically lead to its exclusion. Indeed, it
may still be helpful in certain cases and, at an earlier historical moment, was probably
wisely admitted. What may ultimately tip the scales against BWS is not the episte-
mological critique per se but the political one, supported by research suggesting a
more plausible alternate way to interpret many battered women's situations. See supra
Part II.B; infra Parts IV & V.
258. See Taslitz, MyselfAone, supra note 23, at 24-30, 93-102. Whether clinicians can in
fact do these things is, of course, the subject of intense debate. Compare Richard J.
Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionah in the
Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. Rsv. 427 (1980)
(clinicians can do these things), with Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note
115, at 1072-78 (deriding most clinical judgment as "suppositional science"). I have
fallen on the Bonnie and Slobogin side of the debate, arguing that under certain very
case-specific conditions, we should admit clinical testimony, even sometimes when it
is mere "suppositional science." See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23. The question
is ultimately one of the "plausibility" of the clinician's claims, a notion I will revisit in
the companion piece to this one.
259. See Taslitz, MyselfAone, supra note 23, at 73-83. Videotaping interviews, using any
available actuarial formulae, narrowing opinions to the relevant situations in which
they have the most power, and stating the level of confidence in an opinion are addi-
tional safeguards. See Taslitz, Myself/one, supra note 23, at 73-83.
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A. The Acute Observer
My earlier piece addressed the clinical judgment of psychologists,
particularly regarding character evidence. But many of the arguments
that I raised there can be more broadly applied to any social science
evidence relevant to-mental state. For example, one of the things that
social science experts bring to the table that laypersons do not is a
keener talent at observation.2 6 Thus forensic linguists-who study the
use of ordinary conversation in speech events relevant to the law 261-
can offer helpful observations regarding speech crimes-bribery, ter-
roristic threats, conspiracy and perjury:262
[L]inguists know what to listen for in a conversation. They
listen for topic initiations, topic recycling, response strate-
gies, interruption patterns, intonation markers, pause
lengths, speech event structures, speech acts, inferencing,
ambiguity resolution, transcript accuracy, and many other
things. Scientific training enables linguists to categorize
structures that are alike and to compare or contrast struc-
tures that are not. Linguists understand the significance of
context in the search for meaning in a conversation and are
unwilling to agree with interpretations wrenched from con-
text by either the prosecution or the defense.26s
In one case, the defendant, a chemical manufacturer, was charged
with conspiring to find a pill press to aid a drug dealer.2" The sus-
pect's defense was that he was so uncomfortable, when he finally
realized what the other party had proposed, that he sought only to get
260. See Taslitz, MysefAlone, supra note 23, at 94.
261. See ROGER W. SHuY, LANGUAGE CRMEs: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE Evi-
DENCE IN Ha CouRTmooM at xv-xxii, 200-05 (1993).
262. See Smw, supra note 261, at xviii-xix.
263. S-Ir, supra note 261, at xviii.
264. See SHUY, supra note 261, at 162-73 (summarizing the facts and arguments re-
counted here concerning the "Dean Brewer case"). I use this case from Shuy's book
because it effectively illustrates the power of experts to observe closely and describe
social conduct. Professor Shuy is vague about the data sources drawn on for his ulti-
mate conclusion that no real promise or conspiratorial agreement had been made.
That vagueness is likely due to the nature of his book-an effort to popularize the in-
sights of forensic linguistics, rather than to reach a professional audience of linguists.
Therefore, I express no opinion regarding whether his testimony in the case would,
overall, be helpful to a jury.
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out of the conversation. His audiotaped statements did not, therefore,
reveal his agreement to anything.
A linguist was able to explain why the early offers were ambigu-
ous (thus explaining why the listener would participate for so long),
and to point out why social politeness rules would make it hard for
the listener to extricate himself from the conversation. Similarly, the
linguist noted that the listener-defendant brought up only fifteen per-
cent of the topics raised, spoke only fifteen percent of the words used,
and spoke in much shorter utterances than did the primary speaker.
Furthermore, most of the listener's turns at talk were one-word utter-
ances, largely feedback markers, "uh-huh," "yeah," "hmm," "oh,"
"okay," and "man." These tactics were arguably efforts of the listener
to distance himself from the conversation without alienating the pri-
mary speaker.
The only direct statement of agreement by the listener was in of-
fering to "check around" in direct response to the speaker's asking
where he could get a pill press. But eight days later, in a second con-
versation, the listener simply reports, "I haven't had any luck." This
lack of specificity about where and how he looked, about his prior
experiences with or contacts in locating pill presses, and his lack of
enthusiasm or elaboration, are the kind of hollow offers-like "Let's
get together for lunch sometime'-that we often use to end uncom-
fortable exchanges quickly."5 This combination of close observation of
the defendant's speech with background information on the socio-
dynamics of ordinary conversation offered a plausible alternative to
the prosecution's conspiracy theory.2
265. See Ssty, supra note 261, at 172.
266. A jury never had a chance, however, to render its judgment on Shuy's theory. Despite
the confidence of Shuy and Brewert attorney, Brewer ultimately pled "guilty to mi-
nor charges rather than face the trauma of the courtroom." SHuy, supra note 261, at
173.
Note too that Shuy's testimony included both what ordinary persons would
consider simple observations and more overt theory-based opinions. For example,
Shuy does more than describe the percentage of topics raised and words used by the
defendant. He explains the theory (and its basis) that such techniques are used by
speakers to distance themselves from others, and he opines (and gives his reasons
therefor) that the defendant was attempting such distancing. See SHuy, supra note
261, at 162-73. I argue that Shuy's observations would be meaningless to the jury
without such opinions. There is, however, a healthy debate about whether social sci-
entists, such as psychiatric clinicians, should be able to include opinions,
explanations, and inferences with their observations. For a summary of that debate
and a more extended statement of why I sometimes side with those favoring offering
the opinions, see Taslitz, Mysef Alone, supra note 23. See also infta note 320
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B. Evidentiary Richness
Social scientist expert witnesses often repeat the first-hand testi-
mony of lay witnesses. A battered woman and family members might
choose to testify about the defendant's history of battering his wife.
Yet a psychologist would necessarily need to repeat those incidents as
bases for her testmony. Moreover, such a witness might, based on a
combination of admittedly incomplete or flawed empirical data and
psychological theories, observations, and tests, opine about the kinds
of psychological reasoning processes and social pressures that would
offer one plausible, consistent explanation of the woman's behavior.26
Why ever admit testimony that is repetitive and offers opinions based
on either inconclusive empirical data or the kinds of individualized
judgments that empirical, Popperian science so abhors?269 The answer
lies in the narrative coherence of human lives. Nevertheless, we must
be cautious in admitting such testimony and subject it to the kinds of
safeguards noted above.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized why this is so in
Old Chiefv. United States.' ° In that case, Old Chief was charged with,
in addition to assault and weapons charges, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1).Y That section makes it a crime for anyone convicted of a fel-
ony to possess any firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate to his
having a prior felony conviction, arguing that this "rendered evidence
(explaining why jurors are unlikely to be intimidated by social scientist's recitation of
their conclusions). I do not address whether there might be "ultimate issue rule"
problems with testimony like Shuy's, for I see such problems largely as a matter of
phrasing and presentation, rather than any serious substantive limitation on expert
testimony. See FED. R. EvID. 704(b) (stating that an expert testifying about a criminal
defendant's mental condition may not state an opinion on whether the defendant had
a mental state that is an element of the crime or defense); United States v. Masat, 896
F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 704(b) applies to "only a direct
statement on the issue of intent").
267. See, e.g., Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 23, at 14-44 (describing the bases for
"psychological character evidence"). For a discussion of the differing views about
whether, when, and for what purposes an expert may recite the bases for his opinion,
see Edward J. Imwinkeried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule ofEvidence 703, 47 MacEa L Rnv. 447, 471-80 (1996).
268. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 23, at 91-98 (discussing suppositional science,
plausible alternatives, and storytelling in the courtroom).
269. See Taslitz, Mysef Alone, supra note 23, at 91-102 (responding to the Popperian
critique of clinical judgment).
270. Old Chief v. United States, - U.S. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
271. See Old Chie, 117 S. Ct. at 646.
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of the name and nature of the offense [assault causing serious bodily
injury] inadmissible" because of the risk of unfair prejudice.' 2 The
prosecutor refused to so stipulate, and the trial court denied Old
Chiefs motion to limit any testimony about his prior conviction to
the information offered in his stipulation."' The name and nature of
his prior conviction were revealed at trial, and a jury convicted Old
Chief on all counts1 The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, found no abuse
of the trial judge's discretion. 275
The Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit.276 The Court did so, however, only because of its .con-
clusion that the testimony about the defendant's prior conviction
added no "evidentiary richness" to the stipulation.'m Given the dan-
gers of jury misuse of the prior assault conviction's details as
inappropriate character evidence, unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighed probative value and required exclusion of the details under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.278 The Court's concept of "evidentiary
richness" echoes many of the themes in this Article. The Court's dis-
cussion of the point is thus worth an extended quotation:
[M]aking a case with testimony and tangible things not only
satisfies the formal definition of an offense, but tells a col-
orful story with descriptive richness. Unlike an abstract
premise, whose force depends on going precisely to a par-
ticular step in a course of reasoning, a piece of evidence may
address any number of separate elements, striking hard just
because it shows so much at once; the account of a shooting
that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much
about the triggerman's motive and intent. Evidence thus has
force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its
pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with
power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
272. Old Chief 117 S. Ct. at 646.
273. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648.
274. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648
275. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649.
276. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649.
277. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651, 655-56.
278. Interestingly, the Coirt rejected an atomistic Rule 403 evidence analysis, one that
would view proffered evidence "as an island," in favor of a more holistic, contextual
approach. This latter approach, fblly consistent with feminist theory, looks to the re-
lationship among a proffered piece of evidence, alternative forms of proof available,
and "evidentiary richness." See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
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willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they
may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict. This persuasive
power of the concrete and the particular is often essential to
the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law
places on them.279
The Court goes on to explain that jurors may find it difficult to
either send another human being to prison or hold out for acquittal.
But the Court said:
When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account
of what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish
what no set of abstract statements ever could, not just to
prove a fact but to establish its human significance, and so to
implicate the law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obli-
gation to sit in judgment.280
Moreover, the Court concluded that jurors' expectations of re-
ceiving certain evidence, and in a certain form, might be violated by a
stipulation. Failed expectations create the impression that the prose-
cutor is "cloaking something" when he is not.28' "A syllogism is not a
story," said the Court, "and a naked proposition in the courtroom
may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove
it."2 2 Jurors hearing a story interrupted by "gaps of abstraction" will
be puzzled by "missing chapters."2 3 An assurance that the missing
chapters are there is never more than second best. 4
279. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
280. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653-54.
281. See Old Chief 117 S. Ct. at 654.
282. Old Chief 117 S. Ct. at 654.
283. Old Chief 117 S. Ct. at 654.
284. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654. For an interesting analysis of the tactical uses of
"irrelevant evidence," and an argument that they are not completely irrelevant, com-
pare David Cramp, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous. L. Ray. 1 (1997)
(concluding that the Federal Rules of Evidence must be revised in order to adequately
prevent the introduction of some types of irrelevant evidence), with Myrna S. Raeder,
Irrelevancy: It's All in the Eyes of the Beholder, 34 Hous. L. Rav. 103 (1997)
(commenting on Crump and offering other suggestions on how to better handle ir-
relevant evidence). While Crump seeks to minimize the use of such evidence, some of
the uses he describes seem highly relevant to the concept of "evidentiary richness" ar-
ticulated in Old Chi.f
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The same logic governs expert testimony, as the forensic linguist
conspiracy case above illustrates. 5 The jurors would readily hear the
tape of the defendant's pill press conversation in the prosecutor's case
in chief. At first blush, that conversation suggests a straightforward
tale: a greedy chemical manufacturer seeks to cash in on the illegal
drug market. But the heightened observational skills and specialized
knowledge of the linguist fill in missing information not immediately
heard by the untrained ear: the defendant's relative silence, his use of
uncomfortable minimal responses, and his vague and terse answers to
questions. When these observations are put into their social context-
an understanding of linguistic politeness rules-a plausible alternative
story is suggested. An uncomfortable, even frightened, man unsuc-
cessfully tried to extricate himself from an unpleasant and dangerous
conversation.
C. Overcoming Cognitive Blinders
Jurors need help to overcome cognitive blinders and social preju-
dices that crowd out alternative, liberating tales. Jody Armour explains
that much racism results from unconscious, automatic, cognitive hab-
its (stereotypes), rather than ill will.28 Yet empirical data on gender
prejudice suggests that the effects of these habits can be mitigated for
those whose conscious belief is that gender stereotyping is wrong.2
Armour concludes, therefore, that judges can reduce the effects of
courtroom racism by excluding symbols that activate racial stereo-
types, and making "rationality enhancing" group references
throughout the trial."' Such references "challenge the factfinders [sic]
to reexamine and resist their discriminatory responses [to] enhance the
rationality of the fact-finding process. " 29 Tentative evidence suggests
that expert testimony can aid jurors in the latter task by alerting them
to their own biases and prejudices. 20 Experts are particularly helpful
because some experimental data suggests little change in subjects' be-
liefs after merely being confronted with contrary discrediting
285. See James W. McElhaney, Terms of Enlightenment: Articulate Experts Help Jurors
Visualize Facts, 83 A.B.A. J. 82-83 (1997), for an argument that an expert's most
important role is as a storyteller.
286. See AamouR, supra note 94, at 130-41.
287. See ApmouR, supra note 94, at 140.
288. SeeAMouR, supra note 94, at 147-53.
289. AmRoua, supra note 94, at 149.
290. See.AVmoup, supra note 94.
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information.29 ' However, there is a significant effect on such beliefs
when the subjects are given an explicit theoretical explanation of the
mental processes that cause them to hang on to their flawed beliefs.292
A feminist evidence law similarly uses experts to challenge inadvertent
patriarchs to change their ways.
For example, Aviva Orenstein has proposed broader use of expert
testimony on the dynamics of rape.293 Such testimony might include
debunking certain rape "myths" relevant to the particular case.294 The
expert would articulate in detail what evidence refutes these myths and
why.295 Perhaps most importantly, the expert would explain the
"psychological pull of the culturalparadigm," that is, why we often re-
main in the grip of these myths even when they are refuted.296
D. Valuing Interpretive Social Science
The importance of stories as ways of conveying human meaning
and aiding jurors' interpretive task argues for the relevance of inter-
pretive ("hermeneutic") social science, in addition to its causal and
rational-choice cousins. Interpretive social science is concerned not
with objective causal processes, but with the meaning of human ac-
tions.29 Such social science explicitly treats social phenomena as texts
to be interpreted. 28 This hermeneutics of human action is based on a
"feeling for the individuality and uniqueness of persons; it is a way to
understand the inwardness of the other."299 Hermeneutic social science
thus purports to offer insight into the uniqueness of the individual.
Yet hermeneuticists also claim to offer generalizable insights. Thus, a
case study investigating a small number of naturally-occurring (rather
than research-created) cases may be viewed as typical of similar cases
or as the basis for a more general theory.3
291. See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 112 & n.635.
292. See Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 112 &: n.635.
293. See Orenstein, No Bad Men!, supra note 219, at 45-61.
294. See Orenstein, No Bad Men,, supra note 219, at 57-58.
295. See Orenstein, No Bad Men!, supra note 219, at 57.
296. Orenstein, No Bad Men', supra note 219, at 57.
297. See DANML LmmrrE, VAImTmIs OF SocIAL EXPLANATION 68-69 (1991).
298. See LrrrLE, supra note 297, at 71.
299. DIMsING, supra note 115, at 106.
300. See MARTYN HAMwmiy, WHAr's WRONG wrrIH ETHNOGRAtPHY? 5-6 (1992).
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For example, Jennifer L. Pierce conducted one type of case study,
an ethnography of legal practice.3 '' Professor Pierce worked for six
months in a law firm and nine months in a corporate legal department
as a paralegal. She also attended a three week National Institute of
Trial Advocacy Training Course for litigators. Finally, she supple-
mented this participant-observer field work with sixty interviews of
randomly sampled lawyers and paralegals."2
Professor Pierce concluded that male lawyers used "boundary
heighteners" to exaggerate their differences from the subordinate
group, female attorneys.3 Thus, male lawyers turned social events
into competitions over who could drink the most beer, for example,
and talked about sports. Partners routinely mistook female associates
for secretaries. Subtle and not-so-subtle sexual harassment of those
associates was also involved. Moreover, Professor Pierce concluded
that women lawyers faced a double-bind: they were branded as overly
aggressive and shrill if combative, weak if more relational.",4
Yet, male associates were praised for their "hard-ball" tactics.
Males also laughed at women lawyers who told tales of their aggressive
behavior, serving thereby to put the women in a one-down position.
30 5
Many of the women preferred, in Professor Pierce's view, a more rela-
tional, caring style of lawyering, one not tolerated by the men.
3 06
Among Professor Pierce's conclusions was that these tactics
treated women lawyers as having a lower social and professional status
than male lawyers. 3°z As a consequence, women were often systemati-
cally blocked from many of the resources necessary for, and indicative
of, success.0 8 By comparing her research with other case studies and
with historical and theoretical work, Professor Pierce portrayed her
study as representative of much of legal practice. Consequently, she
recommended radical changes in the structure of legal practice and of
employment law."°
301. See JmusEp L PmRcE, GENDER TaLus: EMOTIONAL LrvEs rN CorEMPoARr vY Lw
FIEMs 17-22 (1995).
302. See PmRcE, supra note 301, at 17-22.
303. PIRCE, supra note 301, at 107.
304. See PmcE, supra note 301, at 106-39.
305. See PIeRcE, supra note 301, at 106-39.
306. See Pimc, supra note 301, at 106-39.
307. See PmRcE, supra note 301, at 177.
308. See PmcE, supra note 301, at 176-81.
309. See PacR, supra note 301, at 181-87. The changes that Professor Pierce recom-
mended include (1) the introduction of courtesy as a valued worker trait; (2)
expanding the scope of Tide VII gender-based harassment to include nonsexual, but
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This illustration demonstrates the important distinction between
"surface" and "depth" hermeneutics in interpretive social science.
"Surface" hermeneutics refers to a person or group's overt messages."O
"Depth" hermeneutics refers to concealed messages.31 Messages may
be cbncealed because we are unaware of all the messages that we send,
we seek to "pretty them up," we give oversimplified accounts, or we
do not trust the observer. 2 Professor Pierce uncovered a deep message
sent by male to female lawyers: "We have higher social status than
you; you must, therefore, not try to rise above your station." Professor
Pierce, of course, went beyond merely identifying the message, finding
that it also played a causal role in female subordination."'
Generalizing from any one study is, of course, risky. Hermeneu-
tic social scientists will sometimes do so, even though the far better
practice is to reach conclusions based on numerous studies, combined
with whatever experimental, quasi-experimental, and other data
sources are both feasible and available. 4 A Popperian might scoff at
relying on even numerous interpretive case studies as little more than
accumulated anecdote. Yet, the Supreme Court has been quite willing
to engage in normative constitutional fact-finding based on anecdote
systematic forms of gender disparagement, exclusion, and hostility- and (3) replacing
the adversary system's "master-slave" ethic with a practice of law that is "egalitarian,
respectful of difference, and empowering." PImRCE, supra note 301, at 181-87. Inter-
estingly, if the second of these changes were adopted, studies like Pierce's would
become relevant in employment litigation to show the discriminatory effects of an
adversarial work environment. The issue for a trial court would then be whether
Pierce's study and others like it are "reliable" under Daubert.
310. See DIMsING, supra note 115, at 107.
311. See DIMsING, supra note 115, at 107.
312. See DIMsING, supra note 115, at 125-28. Psychoanalysis, so derided by Karl Popper,
is viewed by some analysts as a legitimate form of depth hermeneutics. See DIESING,
supra note 115, at 129-38, 143. Popper had his own hermeneutic theory, based on
assumptions of radical methodological individualism and human rationality. See
DIMsING, supra note 115, at 143. Some theorists have argued that modem
hermeneutic philosophies of social science are compatible in many ways with
Popper's scheme if these particular aspects of Popper's theory are discarded. See
DIMSING, supra note 115, at 143. While my companion piece will be critical of
Popper, that piece will argue that a softer version of Popperianism can offer us useful
insights.
313. See DmsING, supra note 115, at 107-13, 137-42.
314. See HAMMEmLEY, supra note 300, at 86-91, 183-97 (stating the guidelines for gen-
eralizing from case studies); Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 23, at 100-02
(discussing the necessity of viewing a case study in the context of experimental and
other sources of data as part of "converging lines of inquiry").
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noteworthy for its "breadth and detail." 35 A feminist's trust of an in-
formed jury's communal decision-making suggests a useful role for
such "anecdote" at trial as well. Hermeneutic social scientists also
agree that there are standards for separating good from bad interpre-
tive social science. Riceour explains this as involving a "dialectic of
guessing and validation," a new form of confirmation and refutation
not based on either a propositional model or falsifiability.3" This new
model, in Riceour's view, is more like a transformed version of textual
criticism in the humanities.1 7
How to judge the value of interpretive social science is discussed
in the companion piece to this Article.3 8 For now the point is simple:
interpretive social science focuses on identifying plausible interpreta-
tions of human text. This focus is consistent with a feminist vision of
the human mind as linguistic and narrative.3 9 A feminist approach to
social scientific evidence will thus display a natural affinity for the in-
terpretive turn in social science. 320
315. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court. Why the
First Amendment Is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal
Profession, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETics 781, 819 (1996).
316. Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, The Interpretive Turn: A Second Look, in IN-
Trm'RET=V SocIL ScmNCE: A SECOND LOOK 9 (Paul Rabinow & William M.
Sullivan eds., 1987).
317. See Rabinow & Sullivan, supra note 316, at 9.
318. See Taslitz, FeministApproach Revisited, supra note 7.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 52-107, 143-214.
320. One colleague, in reviewing a draft of this Article, contended that interpretive social
scientists do not educate the jury but simply impose their views on the jury in
authoritarian (and thus anti-feminist) fashion. That is not true. Interpretive social sci-
entists should be barred from reciting any opinion without fully explaining the
reasons therefor in a way that enables the jury to judge for itself whether the expert is
right. Thus in our linguist example, the linguist must be able to point to any specific
studies he relied on regarding speakers' social distancing techniques and must explain
why they should be credited. He must further identify precisely what observations
(such as the small number of topics raised and the use of feedback markers and am-
biguous responses) support his opinion about the defendant's intentions and why. See
Taslitz, MyselfAlone, supra note 23, at 90, 113-16 (noting the importance of gauging
the clinician's ability to educate the jury about the bases for his opinion). There is
also little danger that such an expert's opinion will overwhelm the jury. To the con-
trary, there is much reason to believe that jurors are skeptical of social science experts,
especially if offered by the defense. See Scott E. Sundby, TheJury as Critic: An Em-
pirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 6 VA. L. Rnv.
1109, 1178-84 (1997). For such experts to be persuasive, they must integrate their
testimony with the case's specific facts in a way that provides a coherent narrative
consistent with, and that makes sense of, the lay testimony. See Sundby, supra at
1179-81. Furthermore, jurors will not substitute the expert's judgment for the ju-
rors' own. See Sundby, supra at 1179. Rather, the jurors must be able to understand
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V. EVIDENTIARY PoLITICs
This Article has sought to lay the foundation for a feminist ap-
proach to social scientific evidence. One core insight of such an
approach was that mental state is an interpretive act rooted in the lin-
guistic nature of thought and the narrative coherence of human lives.
From that insight, this Article drew various conclusions regarding ex-
pert social scientific evidence about mental state: (1) experts regarding
social context and juror cognitive blinders are essential to promoting
fair verdicts; (2) both interpretive and Popperian social science may be
useful; and (3) case-specific expert opinion, including the informed
speculations of clinical psychologists, can sometimes be helpful. These
conclusions and others made here all turn on a second crucial insight:
all evidence law is political. This second insight requires further elabo-
ration.
A. Epistemic Power
The political nature of evidence law inheres in the institution of
the jury. All jurors, we have seen, bring preconceptions and cognitive
schemes to their task. 2' Those preconceptions and schemes are rooted
in cultural stories, class, race, and gender-based experience.2 Conse-
quently, members of different groups often share particular visions of
reality."a Evidence rules, I have argued, can affect which visions pre-
the evidence supporting the expert's view, evidence that must meet their independent
common sense evaluation. See Sundby, supra at 1179-84 & n.156. This behavior is a
far cry from obedient deference to an authoritarian master.
321. See supra notes 256-97 and accompanying text.
322. See ARMoUR, supra note 94, at 81-89, 130-47; Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note
15.
323. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. My position is not an essentialist one.
Each person is unique. Furthermore, there is no single, essential African-American,
Jewish, or Latino position on any one issue, nor for any of these groups is there a sin-
gle worldview to which every group member subscribes. Nevertheless, partly by
virtue of being a member of various groups, we are more likely to share certain expe-
riences with other members that "outsiders" will not have. Life experience thus
contributes to our worldview, and, on average, group members will share many per-
spectives. See BROwN, supra note 92, at 42 ("[G]roups have varying ways of viewing
the world; they hold different values and attitudes; and, in the last analysis, they be-
have quite uniquely."). Moreover, our self-concept usually includes identification
with certain groups precisely because we see their experiences, goals, values, or atti-
tudes as different. See, e.g., TOM tR TYLER Ai at., SocIAL JUsTlcE IN A Drvmisa
Socmy 26-30, 185-88 (1997) (discussing why people identify with groups). Our
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vail, or even whether one vision, rather than another, is heard at all.
Visions that prevail with any consistency will thus assist one group in
accumulating social resources, like physical freedom, money, and
other kinds of power-often at another group's expense. 32 This type
of power, what I call "epistemic" power, defines what is real.
Evidence rules have epistemic political power because they affect
which social visions of reality prevail and who benefits thereby. Robert
Mosteller has illustrated what I am calling epistemic power in the
context of the battered woman syndrome:
[E]ven though the precise elements of BWS are uncertain
and some aspects of the syndrome's scientific foundation re-
main weak or unproven, judges and legislators believe BWS
to be better than the existing ignorance of jurors. The social
reality facing battered women is not a matter that can be ex-
cluded from jury consideration. With or without expert
testimony, that reality--or a stereotypical distortion of it-
will be a part of the jury's reasoning process. Leaving jurors
to their untutored biases in this situation is not particularly
inviting, and even an incomplete scientific examination of
the issue is likely to be superior. The general perception is
that the science is sufficient to support the intuition of
judges, legislators, scholars, and much of the public that the
experience of women who have been battered renders rea-
sonable much that jurors often find unreasonable.325
uniqueness comes from our own particular combination of group experiences and
identifications and that unique set of genes and experiences that only we have. Un-
derstanding any individual, therefore, requires understanding his or her group
memberships, unique life experiences, and special inherited traits.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 178-95.
325. Mosteller, supra note 124, at 487. Even where we lack empirical data on what jurors'
"untutored biases" are, there are trustworthy humanistic alternatives for identifying
those biases, such as the exploration of philosophy, history, legal precedent, and vari-
ous manifestations of high and popular culture. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold
Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS .. 15, 17-
42 (1990) (proving without empirical data that judges and juries hold a mythic belief
in the infallibility of dog-scenting evidence). Professor Raeder also seems to agree
with Professor Mosteller that even an "incomplete scientific examination" is some-
times good enough. See Raeder, Double-Edged Sword, supra note 141, at 793-97
(favoring certain uses of BWS, despite methodological flaws, because the large
amount of supportive anecdotal evidence being gathered will allow a dearer look at
the issues involved).
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Mosteller is only expressly addressing the first aspect of epistemic
power-the power to define social reality-while implicitly addressing
the second-the power to funnel resources to a particular group, here,
women. Yet Mosteller sees his task as rooted in traditional evidentiary
notions of accuracy: "BWS evidence on balance," he says, "helped
produce more accurate results than would have resulted from its ex-
clusion, given the limits of our ability to understand and describe
social phenomena, the magnitude of the problem of domestic vio-
lence, and the requirement that cases be decided without delay."3
But how does he know that the results achieved with BWS are
more "accurate"? He cannot travel back in time to observe earlier
events in decided cases, even if it were then possible to "see" the
woman's mental state. And he concedes that, by Popperian standards,
the scientific foundations of much of BWS "remain weak or un-
proven." He objects to jurors' "untutored biases," but why is their
preconceived notion of social reality any worse than the BWS alterna-
tive? His answer is simply that the BWS voice must be heard because
the admittedly flawed science (from a Popperian perspective) is
seemingly adequate when combined with elite and popular "intuition"
that BWS embodies the "experience of women who have been bat-
tered.
3 27
"Intuition," however, is based on worldview. Furthermore,
trusting what, from a particular perspective, is flawed science requires
either an alternative view of when scientific data is trustworthy (is
"knowledge") or a belief that the other side bears the burden of
showing that it is not.3" Additionally, Mosteller makes the essentially
moral argument that the BWS version of battered women's experience
renders conduct "reasonable" that would otherwise be seen as
ccunreasonable." Mosteller's entire argument is thus over whose vision
of social reality should prevail, that is, who should have epistemic
power.
Mosteller is therefore wrong to concede that political considera-
tions are at work in BWS case law, and yet to apologize for that fact
by justifying BWS on purportedly traditional evidentiary grounds of
"accuracy." He apparently does so because he is bound by a realist
326. Mosteller, supra note 124, at 515 n.181.
327. Mosteller, supra note 124, at 487.
328. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach Revisited, supra note 7; supra text accompanying notes
19-25.
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epistemology."9 Yet we have just seen that in this task he has failed,
for he has implicitly recognized the socially constructed nature of cog-
nitive reality in his argument.
His ambivalence also leads him to shy away from embracing the
raw power aspect of his argument: BWS heightens women's voices in
the public arena, giving them more social and economic resources
than would otherwise be the case."' Instead, he blames this aspect of
the BWS legacy on the impersonal decisions of third parties-courts
and legislatures. 3 1' But he should personally embrace this outcome
with enthusiasm, rather than with distanced reluctance, for reasons
that will soon be clear.
He explains that his reluctance springs from a fear that the raw
power aspects of politicizing evidence law will spread like a virus, in-
329. Mosteller does not expressly address his underlying epistemology. He does, however,
at times recognize that values play a role in fact-finding. See Mosteller, supra note
124, at 489-90. And he obviously understands the role of preconceptions as well. See
Mosteller, supra note 124, at 487. But he seems to interpret these observations largely
as bars to finding a single, apolitical truth; politics enters only because of our limited
empirical data for proving this truth. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 481 (noting
what he sees as the virtual impossibility of conducting controlled experiments on
battering). Thus he concludes, "Society may justifiably believe that the vast majority
of women who die at the hands of their male domestic partners are the ultimate vic-
tims of widespread battering, and that these women are largely, if not entirely,
guildess." Mosteller, supra note 124, at 486. Moreover, his ambivalence about ex-
tending political concerns to other areas of evidence law seems to stem from fears of
wrongful or unsupported convictions of defendants for acts they did not commit. See
Mosteller, supra note 124, at 510-16. In short, he seems reluctant to leave the real-
is's world, failing fully to recognize the interpretive nature of the human mind and
the necessary implications of his otherwise insightful analysis.
330. Mosteller does appreciate how the distribution of resources affects, and is affected by,
evidence rules. Thus, he decries many proposals to relax traditional evidentiary bars as
stemming from political movements that endanger politically weak minorities who
face the forces of anti-crime majorities. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 510-16. He
sees BWS legislation as a way to help a particular oppressed group, battered women.
See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 486. But he does not expressly take the next step: he
does not recognize that the suffering of battered women is one mechanism by which
all women are oppressed by patriarchy. See, e.g., Laura L O'Toole & Jessica IL
Schiffmnan, Preface, in GENDER VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTVES at xi-xiv
(Laura L O'Toole & Jessica R Schiffinan eds., 1997). Indeed, the everyday opera-
tion of such mechanisms constitutes patriarchy. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra
note 15, at 402-04. Our epistemic judgments thus necessarily have broad implica-
tions for political relationships among various, often large, social groups.
331. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 484-91, 495 (repeatedly describing the admissibil-
ity of BWS as a political and social judgment made by courts and legislatures, while
being undear or ambivalent about the extent to which he personally views that
judgment as a wise one).
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fecting relatively healthy organs of the body politic."2 Thus, he is
troubled by proposals such as those creating new hearsay exceptions
for statements by certain victims of sexual or domestic violence and
new pro-admissibility rules for expert testimony on battering pro-
files.333 But these reforms largely seek to prove acts. I am arguing only
for a healthy embrace of epistemic politics when proving mental state.
These proposed reforms concerning the proof of criminal acts may or
may not be justified on other grounds, but because they involve a re-
alist epistemology-Johnny either hit his wife or did not-political
concerns deserve less weight.
B. Interest Group Politics
Mosteller also inadequately distinguishes (though he senses the
distinction) between epistemic and interest group politics.3M Epistemic
politics involves an intellectual debate over what versions of social re-
ality deserve a voice in the courtroom. The pragmatist's version of
epistemic politics recognizes that what is right in a particular case can
be determined without a universal theory of what is right 3 Ideally,
then, judges should exercise guided discretion in determining what
"truths" are plausible. 6 While values and worldviews (and thus poli-
tics) unquestionably enter into this analysis, the judge should
endeavor to root those values and worldviews in more than personal
biases. Judges should be candid about what values and views they find
plausible and why. 7 They should follow the guidelines noted here for
when an interpretation is plausible. 8 Judges engage in analogous tasks
everyday: they rely on policies, values, and history, purportedly rooted
in authoritative sources beyond their own raw power, in creating and
332. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 509-16.
333. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 509-16.
334. He does note in a footnote that politics can indude both a "moral component" and
"the exercise of self-interested power by groups," Mosteller, supra note 124, at 465
n.15, but he does not fiurther develop the distinction. He also fears majoritarian poli-
tics, but by not dearly distinguishing interest group and epistemic politics, he seems
to reject both as playing any desirable role in evidence law beyond certain narrow ex-
ceptions. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 509-15. The former should (where
possible) be rejected, while the latter should not.
335. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 390.
336. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 395-99 (arguing for guided dis-
cretion in trial judge interpretation and application of evidence rules).
337. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 399-401.
338. See Taslitz, FeministApproach Revisited, supra note 7.
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applying both statutory and common law."' The task is one for which
they are well-suited.3"
The result may, of course, involve "raw power" in that one group
may benefit or suffer. But who gains and who loses is often a legiti-
mate part of legal analysis, as evidenced by the law of equal
protection.34
This whole process differs radically, however, from interest group
politics. With interest group politics, various groups vie, typically to
obtain benefits from the legislature using any legitimate (and some-
times illegitimate) tool available. Group competition may also extend
to any other decision-making body, beside the legislature, with re-
sources worth seeking 4 2 One group might, for example, offer to
support or to oppose a legislator's re-election in exchange for a good
result. Another group may offer to trade its future support for legisla-
tion X in exchange for the legislator's present support of legislation Y.
Bargaining rules the day." Sometimes the most powerful group is the
majority, and it takes a highly principled (or lame duck) legislator to
fight clear majority will.3" If courts engage in this kind of interest
group politics, they will indeed fail in their role "as a brake on popular
sentiment," as Mosteller worries.5
Openly meditating, however, on whether jurors misperceive the
life experience of victims and suspects should not delegitimize the
courts, nor should candid concern that an oppressed group's voice will
339. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 353-54, 360-95.
340. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 390-401.
341. See JoHN E. NovAK & RoNxA D. ROTUNDA, CONSTmouI L LAW § 14.3 (5th ed.
1995) (discussing the Court's application of strict scrutiny to many equal protection
violations in which a "suspect class" suffers).
342. See Tasitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 355-57, 372-78.
343. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method supra note 113, at 355-57, 372-78.
344. See NEIL K Kom.sA, IMPERFEcT ALTERNATIVEs 65-82 (1994).
345. Mosteller, supra note 124, at 513. The point, then, is that embracing evidentiary
politics should not mean that the judge should countenance a tyranny of the major-
ity. Popular sentiment might, for example, favor a particular evidentiary ruling in a
high profile case because that ruling may be perceived as tough on crime. But if the
ruling is also one that would contribute to racial or gender stereotyping and promote
a less caring and egalitarian society, then bowing to majority will would undermine
feminist political values. Similarly, scholars and judicial advisory committees propos-
ing new evidence rules should be wary of enforcing majority tyranny. Evidence law
will be political, and the majority will seek to influence the judiciary (sometimes for
good, sometimes for ill), whether we recognize it or not. What I am arguing for is
candor as a way to enable us to reduce the pernicious effects of politics, while em-
bracing the positive, political value choices that we inevitably must make.
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not be heard do so. Honesty, care, and open-mindedness are traits
that the public will honor from our robed men and women in black.3"
Mosteller's powerful insight that politics partly explains some
group character evidence decisions47 should therefore be welcomed,
not feared; clarified, not ignored; and extended, not cabined. I would
indeed extend his insight in one further way-recognizing that, in
addition to epistemic power, evidentiary politics includes "social
power.
C. Social Power
"Social power" concerns itself with nonepistemic politics, that is,
with value and power-based concerns that have little to do with
"accurate" fact-finding. While epistemic power concerns itself with
defining courtroom reality, social power concerns itself with consti-
tuting us as the kind of society we want to be.
Epistemic power does have an impact on the broader society by
altering the distribution of resources among groups. But social power
focuses on the impact of our evidence practices on society as a whole,
rather than (as do epistemic and interest group politics) the impact on
individuals or groups. Thus, when we define reality, we promote cer-
tain outcomes in trials and thereby shift resources among groups
(epistemic power). But we simultaneously have broader impacts on
society as a whole (social power). For example, seeing some racial
groups as biologically inferior to others is a vision of reality that pro-
motes a racist society, a result that evidence rules can promote or
diminish, thus involving social power." 8
Yet social power is concerned at the same time with more than
the broader social impact of epistemic visions. How a trial is run (to
demean victims or to respect all); how jurors are treated (as a mass of
conflicting biases or as a deliberative community); and how lawyers
behave (as brutal warriors or as respectful promoters of differing
voices in public decision-making) also have broader social conse-
346. See Taslitz, Interpretive Method, supra note 113, at 399-401. Indeed, these same
concerns about the dangers of majoritarian politics might be reason to fear legislative,
but not necessarily judicial, involvement in crafting evidence rules.
347. See Mosteller, supra note 124, at 465-66.
348. SeeAn ouR, supra note 94.
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quences.m This tripartite political schema-epistemic, interest group,
and social power-thus serves as a checklist, a reminder of the politi-
cal pluses and minuses of our evidentiary reasoning. Importantly,
however, social power is not meant to trump epistemic judgments:
policy makers are not asked to promote verdicts that achieve positive
social results at the cost of ignoring the most plausible definition of
"reality" in a particular case. Understanding why this is so is the next
step in explaining and illustrating social power.
The social power concept is also rooted in pragmatism. 50 Prag-
matists recognize that every decision carries with it a risk of error.35'
But two risks of equal size should be weighed differently if they im-
pose different absolute costs.352 For example, not setting your alarm
clock on a Saturday morning may mean that you miss an exciting
baseball game, but not setting your alarm on a weekday when you are
due to start a multi-million dollar trial may cost you your job. The
risk of your sleeping late may be the same in each instance, let us say
ten percent. The cost of your mistake is much higher, however, in the
latter case than in the former. The pragmatist will, therefore, certainly
set his alarm before the trial, though he might risk not doing so before
the ball game.
Evidence rules also involve risks of error and associated costs.353
Social power focuses on the costs imposed on society as a whole,
rather than on any group or individual. Thus, assume that excluding
RTS creates a twenty percent chance of an erroneous acquittal. The
349. Each of these three illustrations, while partly implicating more than only the formal
rules of evidence, are matters of important concern to evidence scholars. Our
evidentiary practices must include formal evidence rules, informal customs, and
lawyer's ethical codes, for all affect fact-finding and define the adversary system that is
the bedrock for our methods of fact-determination. See, e.g., MRJAN R. DAMASA,
EvwmcE LAw ADRius 74-124 (1997) (discussing the connection between the
adversary system and evidentiary rules and practices); PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY
LAwYRs BHAvE As THEY Do 52-56 (1998) (stating the interrelationship among
ethical codes, the adversary system, and fact-finding); TAsunz, CuLTuRE ol THE
COURTROOM, supra note 15 (illustrating this interrelationship in rape cases); Taslitz
& Styles-Anderson, supra note 315, at 787 (arguing that "the non-regulation [in the
code of ethics] of lawyer racism, sexism and ethnic bias presently undermines" the
fct-finding process).
350. See RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURisPRUDENcE 26-30, 71-100 (1990)
(articulating the pragmatists' approach to jurisprudence).
351. See PosNaR, supra note 350, at 299-300.
352. See PosNm., supra note 350, at 299-300.
353. See APmouR, supra note 94 (describing the risks of trial error resulting from, and the
associated social costs, ofjurors' racist attitudes).
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reason for that error might be that juries buy into various sexist biases
that distort the social reality of rape victims. Buying into those biases
and declaring a violent sexual act "non-rape" contributes to gender
inequality.3 4 Psychic pain will be felt by the many women whose faith
in the justice system will be rattled. 35 These effects are magnified by
large numbers of erroneous verdicts. Moreover, although one group
(in this case women) suffers, the significant harms are the social ones
that damage the polity as a whole-a more unequal, less caring, less
legitimate social order.116 We should, therefore, take the social cost of
our potential error into account in crafting admissibility rules regard-
ing RTS.
There is, of course, an error rate for erroneous convictions result-
ing from admitting RTS. But this kind of error, discussed in terms of
"probative value" versus "unfair prejudice,"357 often makes its way into
traditional evidentiary analysis. Furthermore, the discussion is often in
terms of individual, rather than social, harm-the injustice of falsely
convicting this defendant.358 There certainly are underlying social con-
cerns, such as wasted resources and a decreased confidence in jury
verdicts. Again, these are concerns typically, even reflexively, raised in
criminal evidence discussions. 359 These concerns are so taken-for-
granted that they are not even thought of as "political." Furthermore,
they involve a far narrower range of social concerns than does a focus
on social power. Social power expands our awareness of the political
consequences of evidence law to include unequal respect, shattered
relationships, blocked catharsis, reduced caring, and indeed any social
costs associated with our evidence law.
Note what social power does not do: it does not justify convicting
the innocent purely to serve a broader social need. Rather, social
power simply reminds us of the costs of our mistakes in convicting the
innocent or freeing the guilty.
Social power deserves the most weight in mental-state determi-
nations. This is because epistemic and social power are then likely to
354. See Taslitz, PatriarchalStories, supra note 15, at 394-433.
355. See Wmr, supra note 28, at 103-07, 120-21, 125-27 (recognizing that accounting
for psychic pain caused by legal rules must be a component of a feminist jurispru-
dence).356. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 15, at 433-75. (explaining how oppressive
trial evidence and patriarchy mutually reinforce one another).
357. FED. P, EvID. 403.
358. See McComicic ON EVIDENCE (John William Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)
(summarizing policies behind major evidentiary doctrines).
359. See MCCO cMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 358.
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point in the same direction. Thus, a rule that unduly burdens the task
of bringing rape victims' reality into the courtroom both distorts so-
cial reality and promotes gender inequality.
36
In the real world, of course, we cannot know in any quantitative
way what are the risks and costs of our errors. Worldviews will clash
so that the very process of gauging costs and risks is itself political.
Epistemic and social politics fade into one another. Nevertheless, the
distinction between the two types of evidentiary politics is worthwhile.
While epistemic politics reminds us of the interpretive nature of our
task, social politics reminds us that more than the fate of the parties
before it is in the court's hands. Moreover, both kinds of politics cre-
ate a space for debating the wisdom of the kind of caring and just
social order to which feminists aspire.
CONCLUSION
This Article's central point has been that mental states are inter-
pretive acts, not single, objective truths waiting "out there" to be
discovered. Consequently, tests for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence, like Daubert's, that are based on a realist epistemology make
little sense when applied to social science experts who offer testimony
relevant to a defendant's or victim's mental state.
Furthermore, because the construction of mental states as inter-
pretations necessarily involves the jury, any expert admissibility test
must be based on a substantive theory about the jury's role. This Arti-
cle has argued for a conception of the jury as a deliberative, communal
body, one that feminist theory favors as a body to be trusted in the
first instance. The jury is also a body that must be fully informed,
open to many perspectives, and empathic if it is to serve its role effec-
tively as a "judicious spectator." Therefore, expert evidence rules must
have as their goal improving the quantity and quality of the evidence
in a way that furthers the unbiased, empathic detachment of the jury.
"Empathy" is particularly important for mental-state determinations,
360. See Taslitz, Pariarchal Stories, supra note 15 (explaining how evidence rules and
practices in rape cases distort social reality while contributing to gender inequality). I
have argued here that political concerns are a relevant consideration in admissibility
decisions regarding mental state. For a fascinating and .insightful argument that po-
litical considerations should be given overriding significance in such decision-making,
and for a comprehensive model of how to do so, see Peter Margulies, Adjudicating
Identity: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense (Aug. 20,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the MichiganJournal of Gender & Law).
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which necessarily require the jury to some extent to stand in the de-
fendant's shoes. But social science evidence that does not meet the
standards of Popperian science may, nevertheless, further empathic
detachment.
This Article has sought to illustrate several ways in which non-
Popperian social science can be helpful to empathic, feminist juries: it
offers them an acute observer, provides "evidentiary richness," over-
comes cognitive blinders, and offers insights into the meaning of
human actions and the uniqueness of each individual in a way that
Popperian social science often does not.
Finally, this Article has examined the inherently political nature
of evidence law. All rules of evidence have political aspects to them,
which may include "epistemic power" (imposing one group's visions
of reality on others), interest group power ("might makes right" or
majority rule), and social power (imposing costs on society as a whole,
rather than on any particular group or groups). Evidence rules will
often have these political implications whether we acknowledge them
or not. This Article has argued that candor is best: we should ac-
knowledge the political influences and outcomes at work, and then
either seek to minimize or embrace them as our normative goals dic-
tate. Interest group power is often something to fear, especially where
it serves to allow majorities to oppress minorities or subvert the kind
of caring, just, relatively more egalitarian society to which feminism
aspires. On the other hand, because mental states are interpretive acts,
where there are choices to be made among plausible interpretations, or
where there is a significant risk of error in choosing the most plausible
interpretations, we should seek to encourage liberating, rather than
socially harmful, choices. When we create and apply evidence rules,
therefore, we must be attentive to how they have broader social im-
pacts and the ways that they affect the distribution of resources among
social groups. In other words, we should embrace social and epistemic
power when making expert and other admissibility decisions. But we
should never let political concerns lead us to accept expert testimony
that does not credibly contribute to a plausible interpretation of the
evidence.
The foundations for a feminist approach to social scientific
evidence have, I hope, thus been laid. But a foundation does not a
building make. I still must respond to arguments that my approach
lapses into dreaded relativism. I must also suggest in more detail the
kinds of standards courts must follow to screen out implausible
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mental-state interpretations. In the course of doing so, I must further
challenge the distortions caused by universalistic, masculinist, market-
based notions of truth and "science" versus "non-science" dualisms.
These are the tasks to which my companion piece will turn. t
